Alessandro Costanza - Traduttore Da Tedesco a Italiano. Servizi di traduzione in Arte, Arti applicate, Pittura

Lingue di lavoro:

Da Tedesco a Italiano
Da Cinese a Italiano

Alessandro Costanza
cultural mediator, translator

Ora locale: 13:11 CEST (GMT+2)

Madrelingua: Italiano

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Translation, Interpreting, Editing/proofreading, Software localization, Voiceover (dubbing), Subtitling, MT post-editing, Transcription, Training, Copywriting, Transcreation, Language instruction, Native speaker conversation

Specializzazione:
Viaggi e Turismo	Musica
Arte, Arti applicate, Pittura	Cinema, Film, TV, Teatro
Poesia e Prosa	Telecomunicazioni
Certificati, Diplomi, Licenze, CV	Cucina/Arte culinaria
Alimenti e Bevande	Altro

Prenderà in considerazione il lavoro volontario per organizzazioni no profit registrate

Traduzioni di prova presentate: 1

Da Cinese a Inglese: TRADITIONS REVIVAL AND FAITH AWARENESS.AN ESSAY ON THE REVIVAL OF POPULAR RELIGIONS IN CHINA General field: Scienze sociali Detailed field: Antropologia
Testo originale - Cinese 中国宗教报告（宗教蓝皮书2010）稿件*（蓝皮书第152-189页）传统复兴与信仰自觉 ——中国民间信仰的新世纪观察陈进国摘要：近百年来，“现代性话语”（民族主义话语）执著地将民间信仰或民间教派视为“封建迷信”或历史沉渣，并构成中国现代化历程中的“反宗教运动”背景。当代中国民间信仰的适度复兴趋势是“文化中国”传统复兴的重要组成部分，并参与刺激了本土化的“信仰自觉”意识和实践。当前学界所争论的宗教生态论脱离不了中国政教关系的独特语境，是对近代中国“反封建迷信”或“反宗教运动”之启蒙话语的再反思。宗教生态论的立论基础是一种对本土传统有自知之明的“文化自觉”，以避免地方的“文化中断”或文化生态败落。“非物质文化遗产”范畴在“消解”民间信仰形态的宗教性质判断的难题时，也平添了我们对之非线性的文化理解。中国传统宗教特别是民间信仰的“信仰自觉”意识与实践，是构建中国公民社会之身份意识（公民性）的重要组成部分，并从文化层面上落实其宗教性、民俗性、中华性的三位一体化。当我们梳理关于民间信仰（或民间教派）的认知态度变迁时，能否表明“在中国发现宗教”的中国宗教观或解释话语的一种象征性转变呢？如果说我们的文化态度一定要被安上一个文化符号的话，那么只能称作建立在公民社会基础上的“文化自觉主义”。新世纪中国传统宗教的“信仰自觉”，正是中华文化传统复兴思潮的一种集体表象和文明呐喊。关键词：民间信仰文化中国宗教生态话语共谋　信仰自觉一楔子：新世纪的话语转向？由此上溯数百年，法兰西的拿破仑皇帝金口玉言，一语成谶：“中国一旦被惊醒，世界会为之震动。”如今，21世纪已经被设想为中国人或华人社会的世纪了！在代表“正统性”的主流话语中，中国内地改革开放30年的跨世纪实践被视作“谱写了中华民族自强不息、顽强奋进的壮丽史诗”，是“实现中华民族伟大复兴的必由之路”。“弘扬中华文化，建设中华民族共有精神家园”也上升为“激发全民族文化创造活力，提高国家文化软实力”的战略选项。十年河东，十年河西！新世纪中国内地关于弘扬中华文化和共建精神家园的“话语转向”促使我们认真反思，本土宗教信仰形态及其仪式实践是否同样作为中华文化的核心要素而被同情地理解和尊重，并成为多元的宗教关系“和谐相处”的一极呢？特别是百年来“现代性话语”（民族主义话语或启蒙话语）成功地将“他者”内在化，执著地将民间信仰或新兴教派视为“封建迷信”或历史沉渣，并构成了现代化历程中“反宗教运动”的背景。当我们梳理关于民间信仰（或民间教派）的认知态度变迁时，能否表明“在中国发现宗教”的中国宗教观或诠释话语的一种象征性转变呢？在被“刚性化”、“边界化”或“模块化”的现代中国宗教划分体制中，信仰边界相对模糊的民间信仰形态终将复归何处呢？二文化中国：第三只眼看“中国民间信仰” 在全球化及区域一体化的时代背景下，我们不能仅仅局限于现有的政权或疆域管辖范围来观察中国民间信仰问题，而更应接近于“文化中国”（杜维明语）之象征世界的视角（譬如普适意义上的以华人为主体并运作的社会）来观察其跨世纪的变迁态势。一方面，我们应该“礼失求诸野”，到民间去，并透过中国周边或域外的视野来审视我们自身的文化系统和信仰实践；另一方面，我们更需要“反求诸己”的文化态度，站在域内和本土的立场，参与观察、体验和追问我们的文化主体性和文化标志、文化象征。换句话说，中国民间信仰问题理应被吸纳为“文化中国”之极其重要的文化资源和社会资本之一，即在尊重多元社会“内在的文化关联”的前提之下，搁置“优劣”、“高端”或“低端”信仰，进步或落后，科学或迷信等先在的偏见，并借以观照我们自身之生活方式、社会网络、文化身份、价值观念及情感认知的文化基础，进而理解“文化中国”何以走向华夏化（中华性）的信仰机制和文化模式。所谓“中华免夫左衽，江表此焉缓带”（《宋书•谢灵运列传》）、“中华者，中国也。亲被王教，自属中国。衣冠威仪，习俗孝悌，居身礼仪，故谓之中华”（《唐律疏议•名例律》），“中华”既喻文明教化，也指文明礼仪，有“天下之中”、“华夏衣冠”之谓。因此，全球化背景下的“文化中国”之意义世界，更必须兼顾中华文化的“中华性”和“宗教性”去思考。而中国民间信仰形态所承载的观念体系与生活方式，终究提供了一个我们反观自身的文明视角。从“文化中国”视野中看民间信仰的现状及发展生态，有几点值得关注。其一，在传统中国人眼中的“南洋”地区即东南亚华人社会里，大量源自中国原乡的民间信仰形态成为表达和强化“华族”（华裔）认同的重要载体，以及促进在地文化对话的媒介，从而深刻地影响了中国内地民间信仰形态的复兴走势，有效地刺激了当代中国本土化的“信仰自觉”意识，并参与培育了“跨地方性”的族群认同的文化土壤。清代以降，为了逃避战乱或谋求生路，中国东南地区出现了一股“下南洋”的移民大潮，移民往往随身带去了各类原乡的民间信仰形态，借以承载对故土的文化记忆，以及在异境生存和发展的意义寄托。譬如，在闽、客两系族谱中，通常会记载一首《迁流诗》或《认祖诗》（各版本文字略有差异）：“骏马堂堂出异方，任从随地立纲常。年深外境犹吾境，身处他乡似故乡。朝夕莫忘亲命语，晨昏须荐祖宗香。但愿苍天垂庇佑，三七男儿总炽昌。” 在“故国不堪回首月明中”的时代，没有祖国支持的海外孤民经历了由“落叶归根”到“落地生根”的族群意识之艰难转变。其借以“任从随地立纲常”的重要根基之一，恰恰是慎终追远、饮水思源的祖先崇拜，以及来自原乡的各类宗教信仰形态。在遍布于南洋地区的华人宗祠、义山、会馆、神庙系统中,所谓“华人宗教” 或“拜神教”（Shenism）的传统，即“汲取自民间的、颓败的道教，加上儒教和佛教的影响；而且，或许更重要的是，源自古老庶民宗教” ，终究是无时不在，无所不在的。立足于南洋华人的视野，则“文化中国”中的民间信仰（或民间教派）及其仪式实践，在以伊斯兰教、印度教或南传佛教等他者文明的观照背景下，无疑是代表华族或华人之文明性、中华性的重要的符号或族徽。 20世纪以来，东南亚地区的近（现）代化进程是与西方的殖民主义如影随形的。华南“下南洋”的移民潮及其坎坷起伏的现代族群意识的培育，同样与殖民主义话语脱不了干系。在以非华族为主体的“民族-国家”的构建过程中，“落地生根”的华族（华人）更被视为“外来者”或“非土著”，从而在政治及文化上不断被边缘化。在马来西亚，延续至今的照顾所谓土著特权的新经济国策及针对马共的种族隔离政策——“华人新村运动”，造成“华教”（华文教育）的举步维艰以及华人文化的“碎片化”。在印尼苏哈托军事统治时代，所有华校被关闭，日常不能公开读、听、写中文。彼时泰国的华文教育境况亦差不多。然而，在保障宗教信仰自由的政策下，华人的宫观庙宇、斋堂等及附属其中的华人信仰组织并未遭遇基本性的破坏，反而促成了华人强力维护自身身份和文化主权的“文化自觉”意识和实践。至今，承载着华人宗教信仰传统的义山、会馆和民间神庙系统，依然是当地“华教”的重要资助来源。就如王琛发所指出的，在印尼华人地区，这些文化载体“在无言中成为华人宗教书籍最后的传播据点，也是人们唯一可以藉着宗教掩护学习和使用华文的场所”；“利用印尼语翻译宗教书籍，范围包括从经典到善书以至神怪通俗演义，实际上是借用强势文化的语言文字去维续弱势文化的传承，即使这样的文化传播并不全面，也有偏差，它还是维续了族群的文化认同”。伴随着东南亚民主化的进程和种族主义政治的弱化态势，以及改革开放以来中国区域影响力的扩大，就像王琛发所称，针对华人的同化主义政策居然带来一个预想不到的效果，即“早期迫不得已采用印尼语言的华人宗教书籍，已然不再局限于华人之间。它们也方便其他族群的阅读，反而开启了华人宗教文化向着数以亿计的泛马来人族群展开文化对话的先机”。与此同时，伴随着反共产主义的意识形态的消磁，以及中国和东南亚国家关系的正常化，海外华人在返乡探亲、祭祖、投资的过程中，也积极参与原乡宗祠、民间信仰神庙的修复以及地方的信仰仪式实践，特别是促成了我国东南地区民间信仰形态适度复兴的重要契机。改革开放以来海外华人所带来的“信仰反哺”文化现象，无疑是中国地方的民间信仰形态及仪式实践从“非常态化”迈向“常态化”的重要外力之一，并参与刺激并培育了原乡的本土“文化自觉”意识和地方信仰文化的再营造。值得注意的是，立足于血缘、地缘、语缘（方言）特别是神缘的关系网络的重新维系，使得民间信仰作为有效的文化资本，也参与培育了“跨地方性”的族群认同的文化土壤，诸如在海外华人文化热情刺激之下福建关于“客家祖地”或“客家母亲河”的象征营造，各地方宗祠组织的复兴和跨地方性的修谱、联谱活动等。在应对全球化和区域化的过程中，这种跨国主义（跨区域或跨地方性）的本土信仰互动现象方兴未艾，并促成了一些分散的民间信仰社团组织或同类神神神庙的集结或联合趋势。诸如马来西亚、印尼、新加坡、中国内地、中国台湾等地敬拜妈祖、玄天上帝或瑶池金母、关帝的民间神庙，尝试进行跨区域的串联，以形成一个联谊性的信仰共同体。而东南亚华人教派德教的重要派系——振系和济系，原本也是以扶鸾为主的神庙联合体的产物。其二，在追求中国政治统一的过程中，中国内地时兴的“文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏”的博弈筹码，正在深刻影响着中国民间信仰的发展生态，并参与营造了“信仰再生”的文化空间。尽管复苏的民间信仰“重现”了昔时“文物衣冠”，然而“中华制度”传统在局部地区的返照，是否意味着彼此关于一个文化中华的熟悉感渐入佳境，现在下结论似乎太早。诚如葛兆光所称，近世中国人的世界图像深受“天下主义”观念的深刻影响，特别是在朝贡体系的残阳余晖中，我们经常沉浸在中华文化“光被四表”、“广传四裔”的历史幻象中，习惯于以“东方”自居，中国的他者就是“西方”。然而，自从17世纪满人（所谓“夷虏”或“胡皇”）入关之后，在周边的日本、朝鲜、越南等国已滋生了越来越强的国族（民族）意识，中国的文化形象更被视为“今则四海之内，皆是胡服，百年陆沉，中华文物荡然无余”、“中华古制日远而日亡，将不得复见”，故“今天下中华制度”反存在于彼国云云。周边各国在文化上已然不是一个“中华”（文明），在政治上已然是一个“国际”，在经济上已然是“贸易关系”。彼此之间原来的文化认同已然全盘崩溃，象征着看似同一文明内部的“东方（东亚）”的巨大分裂，并造就了后来直面西方的观念差异。 17世纪以来中国周边文化与政治“渐行渐远”的态势，在20世纪的中国内部仿佛“历史再现”。中国革命的胜利尽管宣告中国人民站起来了，然而“大一统”的政治愿景尚未完成，文化上的分殊似乎反有越加远离之势。在构建欧美化的“民族-国家”的过程中，早期的国共两党在“救亡与启蒙”的时代背景下皆呈现鲜明的“精英主义”文化面向，以期有效地推动中国的现代化。特别是为了加强地方社会控制和新铸国民的意识，双方在划分“迷信、宗教”方面其实富有“家族相似性”，具有理念和政策方面的延续性。不过，政治意识形态和政治实践上的巨大差异也造就了双方在对待民间信仰活动上的态度差异和管治差异，从而造就了不同政权形态下的不同文化景观。在20世纪20-30年代，民国政府颁布的《神祠存废标准》（1928）、《废除卜筮、星相、巫觋、堪舆办法》（1929）、《取缔巫医》（1929）、《取缔经营迷信物品业办法》（1930）等法规，一直视民间信仰形态或部分道教信仰形态为“迷信”而加以“管制”、“废除”、“取缔”，从而“成功地创造出了一种既包含儒家又包含有组织的宗教乃至反迷信运动的理念在内的‘精英’传统。这就是合法的传统，用来反对迷信与民间宗教的世界”。而据洪莹发等学者的研究，1949年国民党退至台湾之后，其对待民间信仰活动的观念更经历了从“神权迷信”到“民俗活动”再到“文化资源”和“文化瑰宝”的价值转变，管治方式更经历了从“查禁”、“革除”到“改善（进）”再到“辅导”的政策转变，以因应台湾社会重视本土文化的浪潮。比如，1950年代“台湾省行政长官公署”发布了《查禁民间不良习俗办法》，禁止崇拜社坛、降鸾扶乩等“神权迷信”，公务人员、民意代表应该带头“禁止迎神赛会，消灭神棍敛财”，直到1965年该办法才被废止。而1959年刊布的《台湾省改善民间习俗办法》则相应提出改善民间祭典习俗暨节省婚寿丧葬浪费的相关条款，以避免“劳民伤财”。1960年台湾省政府下令各县乡镇组织“民俗改进会”，推动民俗祭典的改正工作。至1991年，台湾当局发布《加强改善社会风气重要措施》及《加强改善社会风气重要措施台湾省实施要点》，要求改善并辅导寺庙配合祭典日或节日举办优良传统民俗活动。伴随着台湾经济的自由化、政治的民主化和地方的自治化，台湾一些县市政府也开始将一些富有影响力的民间信仰形态进行“文化资产化”的运作，走“观光化”和“节庆化”的路线，如宜兰县头城、屏东县恒春的“抢孤”，台中县大甲镇澜宫的妈祖“巡境进香”等活动。因此，民间信仰形态也扩大了发展的空间，一些较有影响的民间庙宇成为凝聚地方社会认同的重心和地方势力的竞争场，甚至是一个重要的政治展现场域。有意思的是，上述1949年以前民国政府以及台湾解严前台湾当局针对宗教的“现代性话语”及带有西方宗教观念背景的政策思路，同样为主张“唯物论”和“无神论”的中国共产党和人民政府所延续，并成为系统地“反对封建迷信”、“打击反动会道门”和“清扫牛鬼蛇神”的重要依据。当然，后者的立足点并非像前者一样是以复兴中华文化自居的“精英主义”传统。改革开放之前中国内地在一系列“左”的政治和文化运动（如“破四旧”、“文化大革命”等）影响下，遑论儒家等精英传统的维系的举步维艰，民间信仰形态及其所承载的文化空间并非被温和地管制、查禁或被要求改善和辅导，而是被猛烈地扫除和破坏，甚至砸烂，以致改革开放以来的传统复兴和“信仰自觉”难免承受着更多的文化观念和制度惯性的牵制，以致同台湾等地相比较时难免带有一种“时间差”的错置效应，并持续地造成中国内地“宗教是否自由”的各类风评。让人惊异的是，迟至21世纪初，浙江省仍然用“反对封建迷信”的姿态，动用公权力强势拆除了至少1万多座民间宫庙，并直接引发了严重的文化后果。像2004年“2月15日下午2时15分，浙江省海宁市黄湾镇五丰村一座村民自发搭建的草棚发生火灾，在草棚内从事烧香求签迷信活动的60余人中，40人死亡，3人受伤，还有10余人火海逃生。新京报记者赴当地调查发现，着火庙宇曾先后被拆4次，但随后没多久就重新建起，本次火灾，正是第5次从原地建起的庙宇”。尽管我们可以将1980年代以来台湾地区政治民主化以及中国内地经济市场化的进程视为中国整体的现代化表征，然而海峡两岸意识形态上的根本差异、政治上暂时“分治”的基本格局，以及在针对宗教性质的价值判断和管治措施上的分别，仍然营造出两岸“渐行渐远”的文化心情和陌生感，从而进一步滋养了民粹性的“台湾意识”的文化土壤。比如，戒严时期的台湾当局尽管对所谓“迷信”或“不良习俗”采取了相对温和的“查禁”及“改善（进）”政策，却仍然继承原来的“精英传统”，以弘扬中华传统文化（如中华文化复兴运动）作为巩固其政治意识形态的补充，基本上未采取毁庙、拆庙、砸神像等釜底抽薪式的文化破坏运动，尚不至于构成对民间文化的实质性的摧毁格局，进而在宣传策略上仍然将中国内地视为破坏传统文化的另类政权进行批判。在1960年代，港台新儒家如牟宗三、徐复观、唐君毅、张君劢等在审视传统文化在中国内地的境遇时，同样充满着一种“花果飘零”、“披麻戴孝”的文化情结。不少传统宗教人士甚至片面地声称“五四运动”将中国文化“早已弄得七零八落残破不堪” ，中国内地“五千年来的传统文化……已毁灭殆尽了”。这种极端情绪化的批判立场和表达文化正确的“道德优势”，仍然是将中国内地重新“历史记忆化”，进而在文化定位上鄙视为“伪华夏”或“新夷狄”，仍然被标签为“胡化”、“苏俄化”而非“中国化”，以为中华传统文化的命脉保存在所谓“复兴基地”的台湾和港澳地区，乃至像韩、日等国，故而从文化、政治及信仰上日渐滋生不认同于中国内地的集体心理和悲愤心境。毋庸置疑，近年来中国政府在构建和谐社会中所强调的“弘扬中华文化，建设中华民族共有精神家园”的文化号召，以及针对台湾所发出的“弘扬中华文化，加强精神纽带”的政策宣示，正是对往昔的“线性历史观”及相应实践的拨乱反正，从而在文化上重续由“化外”到“化内”的历史再转变。而台港澳地区作为并未离远的“政治他者”，也给中国内地提供了一个文化反观的重要机缘。特别是台港澳地区以其相对成熟的神明崇拜实践和仿佛“先知先觉”的文化道德姿态，毕竟带动了改革开放以来东南或华南地区本土信仰生态的快速复苏，并参与促进了地方社会重视本土传统的“文化自觉”和信仰实践。在考察民间社会如何充分借用国家对宗教或信仰之合法性边界的界定时，我们也看到各种地方性策略是如何积极运作，从而开启了地方之新的文化资本和社会资本的再生产的。一方面，地方精英和仪式专家积极参与民间庙宇的活动（如地方的退休干部、教师、村落头人参与管理，本地企业主或老板参与捐资建庙，火居道士、师公或礼生等仪式专家负责仪式）以及仪式实践，使得民间庙宇重新成为社区或跨地区的文化权力运作的重心之一，乡土信仰文化借此获得进一步的复兴和发展；另一方面，针对某些具有跨区域影响力的民间信仰庙宇，地方政府更多地采用“信仰搭台，旅游唱戏”的模式，通过中性化的“民俗活动”或旅游区开发等形式进行“观光化”或“节庆化”的市场运作，从而带动了地方信仰文化网络的发展。当然，在经济利益刺激下的公权力的过度介入和充满选择性的信仰操弄，也使得信徒变相成为被动员的对象，从而出现了一些“信仰异化”现象（包括像博物馆加庙宇的双名制策略），并造成了某些信仰形态的拔苗助长以及“党政办庙”的歪风不止。特别是各地政府从实用主义原则出发的双重判定标准（一方面是视为封建迷信或反动会道门的死灰复燃，应该查禁或取缔；另一方面是对资质好的文化资源的利用，进行观光化的操作），也造成了许多的文化实践困境。对于中国政府而言，在海峡两岸长期政治分隔的情形下，相较于寻求文化大一统的长远考虑，追求政治大一统更是迫切的现实。而民间信仰方面的神缘关系直接构成了扩大和巩固统一战线的一大砝码。其中，妈祖信仰或妈祖文化扮演了相当重要的角色。全国政协主席贾庆林给2004年“中华妈祖文化交流协会”成立的贺信富有代表性：“妈祖文化是中华优秀传统文化的重要组成部分，是团结海内外中华儿女、促进海峡两岸交流与合作的桥梁与纽带。”“海内外妈祖文化机构和人员在弘扬妈祖文化、传承中华美德、联系世界华侨华人、促进两岸交流交往等方面，作出了重要的贡献。”妈祖更是被鲜明地赋予了不同的功能和角色，被诗意地称作“海峡和平女神”、“世界统战部长”。“中华妈祖文化交流协会”也以吉祥结及和平鸽为会徽。这种官方主导的文化交流模式被形象地命名为“文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏”。当然，海峡两岸持续升温的妈祖文化交流，带动了两岸持续升温的宗教交流，一方面促进了台湾各宫庙的大陆寻根热和进香热潮，另一方面推动了内地民间信仰庙宇的恢复和开放步伐，并使得民间信仰日益走向“脱敏化”。特别是台湾庙宇的相关运作经验（如台中县大甲镇镇澜宫），“也让大陆庙宇在积极发展寺庙经济时，成为重要的学习模仿对象”。这对于我们重新理解民间信仰等本土文化传统具有相当积极的作用。不过，当我们观察中国大陆以妈祖文化为代表的“文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏”的交流模式时，应该进而冷静地反思“一个妈祖，各自表述”问题。一方面是台湾内部不同地方派系或政治势力的“各自表述”，另一方面则是海峡两岸立足于统独立场的“各自表述”。当“文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏”的官方主导模式替代“信仰（文化）搭台，信仰（文化）唱戏”的民间自导模式之后，我们同样应该警惕那种自我催眠式的统战惯习可能带来的“被交流”的文化反抗意识。像近年来大陆祖庙神明离境巡台的活动一直在“轰轰烈烈”展开，并被某些主事者视为“统战政绩”的重要部分，从而生硬地改变了“祖庙—子庙”拟亲化的礼数和法统，诸如“分灵”子庙须至祖庙“进香”，祖庙神明分身最多只在本境界“绕境”的旧统。其中，1997年“闽台贸易促进会”组织的湄州妈祖巡台102天；2006年山西关帝祖庙复制神尊巡台居然历经三年半，2009年7月尚停驻于台湾；2009年7月南安广泽尊王“巡香”台湾一个月；2010年4月厦门青礁慈济祖宫保生大帝“巡安”台湾本岛。这种高高在上的统战式的“巡香”或“巡安”方式，与其说是一种地方文化表演，不如说是一种地方政治焦灼，有些甚至蜕变为“文化闹剧”。它在不断地弱化祖庙神圣的“超越性”和“正统性”之际，也直接“引发了系谱权威与地方主义之间的矛盾”，从而强化了立足于台湾主体性的“文化抗体”和“政治自觉”。在貌似活络的宗教文化交流背后，妈祖信仰本体的缺失和异化，以及内地信仰民众的仪式缺场，难免养就了“一个妈祖，各自表述”或“两个妈祖”（政治的妈祖和信仰的妈祖）的文化陌生感。当2007年台湾省嘉义县新港奉天宫“开台妈祖”首度跨海“出巡”纽约参与诉求“UN FOR TAIWAN”时，不知以妈祖为“世界统战部长”的鼓吹者有何感慨。因此，尽管复苏的民间信仰“重现”了昔时“文物衣冠”，是否意味着彼此关于一个“文化中华”或“中华制度”的熟悉感渐入佳境，现在下结论还似乎太早。 2003年，中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所课题组《关于福建省民间信仰问题的调研报告》尖锐地指出这种“信仰统战”所带来的困境： 20世纪80年代后期以来福建民间信仰活动中的“妈祖热”，首先是因对台工作的需要而被烘托起来的。10多年下来，我们方面对妈祖等民间信仰在解决台湾问题上的作用出现了两种片面的认识。一种认识基于10多年来到祖庙朝拜的台湾信众已超过100万人次的统计和台湾几大妈祖庙都要借助祖庙来增强自己“正统”地位的事实，认为这“充分反映了台湾同胞盼望祖国早日统一的美好愿望”，而将妈祖诗意地称为“海峡和平女神”、“世界统战部长”。另一种认识是随着10多年来“台独”声浪不断升高、和平统一进程步入徘徊，认为“统派”主要不是妈祖信仰者，“草根性”的“独派”却不一定不信妈祖；台湾信众的朝拜目的“极具功利性”，说他们“对中华文化的认同，对‘台独’的痛恨等等，在很大程度上是基于宣传效果的考量”。如果说后一种认识是过分悲观地放大了宗教情感和民族意识对国家认同和“统”“独”立场之影响作用的有限性和相对性，前一种认识就是对这种有限性和相对性视而不见，过分乐观地在信仰妈祖——认同中国——赞成统一之间划等号；当第一种说法出自目前妈祖祖庙的实际管理者口中的时候，不排除还有对内升高自己政治身价、争取更多管理自主权和经济利益的用心。毋庸置疑，立足于文化理解的换位思考是相当重要的。当1991年中日登山队两次去藏区圣山——梅里雪山探险时，山下的藏人和喇嘛居然都在念经诅咒，因为“征服壮举”在其看来恰是对神山的千古亵渎。而登山队17人的死难恰恰成为“悲欣交集”的印证。汉藏文化间的误读尚且如此，而对于汉文化传统的懵知更情何以堪。因此，海峡两岸政治对峙下的文化结果，尽管彼此营造出信仰文化“同宗同源”的表演效应和互惠格局，然而此岸（统战）与彼岸（信仰）“各得其所”的热忱，以及地方政商于其中的“利益寻租”，于局中人而言难免徒添一腔悲凉的陌生感。或许，渐行渐近与渐行渐远不过一念间耳。17世纪朝鲜使臣叹言“今天下中华制度，独存于我国”的回响，至今在中韩针对各类非物质文化遗产申请的纷争中依然清晰，让人喟叹文化记忆何以如此的顽固不化。其三，伴随全球化和本土化相互激荡的风潮，中国民间信仰（或民间教派）与基督宗教的长时段相遇，彼此仍然充满着机遇与挑战。面对“脱敏化”的囚徒困境，尽管基督宗教占有话语正义优势和发展先机，但彼此“打劫”并非最优的战略均衡。如何营造各自“地活”和“公活” 的宗教和谐局面，形成庙会与教会“信仰共在”的文化格局，值得跟踪观察。关于中国民间信仰与基督宗教（主要指天主教和基督新教）相互激荡的格局（是否代表一种文明间的冲突？），应该合理地追溯到明末清初的“礼仪之争”。“礼仪之争”缘起于明万历十年（1582）耶稣会士利玛窦入华后之“辟佛补儒”的传教方略，彼时反对利玛窦思路的教会各方以“迷信”（Superstition）来评判中国祭祖、祀孔之性质。至17世纪中叶天主教汉文献更是形成了“破迷”佛、道的系统论述。 20世纪初期上海徐家汇耶稣会士禄是遒汇编的《中国迷信》丛书10卷更延续了批判传统信仰与风俗的排他思路。富有教义排他性的基督宗教与富有混合性的中国传统宗教特别是民间信仰的误解和冲突，在晚清的义和团运动中达到高潮。据路遥教授的研究，义和团爆发的直接原因，最早同山东冠县“十八村”中的梨园屯（李阎屯）天主教方济各会的活动有密切关系。梨园屯自同治八年（1869）起就开始出现了“庙堂之争”的民教矛盾，并愈演愈烈。所谓庙堂，“庙”是玉皇庙，而“堂”是天主教堂。梨园屯玉皇庙建于康熙年间，拥有本村义学地多亩，以为本村和四乡敬神赛会之地。方济各会教士于同治年间来此，发展了30来户教民，并向村首提出划分玉皇庙义学地。同治八年新正月十九日，梨园屯村三街会首与地保结合，同教民商议分亩清单如下：立清分单：冠县邑北境梨园屯圣教会、汉教公因村中旧有义学房宅一所、护济义学田地三十八亩。日久年深，风雨损坏，墙垣坍塌，无力修葺。今同三街会首、地保公同商议，情愿按四股清分。汉教三股，应分田地三十八亩，圣教会应分房宅一处，上带破厅房三间，破西屋三间，大门一座，计宅地三亩零九厘一毫，以备建造天主堂应用。（《教务教案档》第五辑）按教民分到地后交给传教士后，传教士则自行拆毁了庙宅拟盖教堂。村民激愤，遂以士绅为首呈诉；传教士在驻华公使、主教支持下向地方官施压，于是形成了村民、教会和官方等三方之间的纷争，并各自进行组织动员和话语操弄，最后局势越发不可收拾，直至1898年义和拳运动的爆发。在晚清梨园屯民教之争中，传统宗教信仰和基督宗教分别以“汉教”和“圣教会”的名目出现，不同势力的信仰认同、政治认同、民族认同等相互交织，错综复杂，以致由信仰之战演变为政治之战、民族之战。卓新平指出：所谓的“礼仪之争”，实质上就是西方只想把自己的东西传过来，而不尊重中国的文化和传统，这样就导致了政治和文化上的冲突。这种冲突结果就是中国重新排斥西方，由开放开门重新走回闭关锁国。……这是中国文化在近代的惨痛教训。我们回顾同义和团运动起因相关的“梨园屯难题”（Liyuantun Puzzle），并非危言耸听，而是旨在表明：尽管中国重新引爆二者大规模的“文明冲突”社会机制已然不复存在，但如何有效地理顺二者的关系问题，仍然是中国内地宗教生态所不能回避的现实问题。如果说二者的“信仰共在”是一种历史的必然，那么又如何从制度安排上未雨绸缪，形成“法（政）规教随”(政府依法管理宗教事务、教会或宗教团体依法传教或从事宗教信仰活动)和“教规政随”（政府管理宗教事务或制定各类法规时应当充分尊重宗教信仰的相关习俗、传统）并存的格局，从而达成信仰上的相互尊重，以促进宗教关系、政教关系的和谐？诚如卓新平在与梁燕城关于基督宗教与中国文化的深度对话中所称：“基督教跟中国文化的关系，有两个层面，一个是中西文化关系的改善，这是一个外部环境的改善，另一个是中国对基督教的态度和基督教对中国的态度，自身对彼此态度的改善，这是内在的因素。” 卓氏警语可谓一矢中的。至今学界的相关调查表明，在基督宗教强势地切入地方的传统生活领域并试图改变固有的文化景观时，往往意味着“生的宗教”与“熟的宗教” 的艰难磨合与宗教色调变化，并相应引发了一系列地方的文化误解和冲突。围绕着基督宗教与中国民间信仰的关系，学界和教界的声音也一直是多元的。晚近“孙冶方经济科学基金会”资助的一个有关基督新教在中国农村传播的调查报告，则通过比较基督新教与民间宗教（信仰）在农村的现状，对基督新陈代谢教在农村引发的社会文化问题进行猛烈的批判。如果说部分官方人士仍然抱持着对基督新教“政治紧张”的话，该报告人则反映出集体的“文化紧张”心态，体现了肇因于本土传统被长期压制的时代挫折感和文化无力感。该报告的作者宣称：就中国农村整体的宗教生态而论，“西方宗教都保持一枝独秀的格局；佛、道信仰的空间虽较改革前有所复兴，但总体状况是逐渐萎缩，民间传统的信仰形式在细枝末节上似乎有‘复兴’迹象，但无法在体系上重构，呈急剧衰败之势”，北方地区尤其如此。基督新教给农村家庭带来紧张和冲突、造成村庄社会分裂、重写中国近代历史、削弱传统文化的主体性、介入村庄社会与政治事务。因此，政府必须转变对传统信仰形式的意识形态偏见，大力扶持民间宗教；宗教政策必须偏紧，从而对普通教徒构成压力；加大对西方宗教的监控力度云云。卓新平曾指出：“现实中我们看到基督教在同中国社会的关系中往往很难做到跟政治没有关系。从某种意义上，基督教在很多方面是在选择政治，问题是你要选择怎么样的政治，这在中国也是非常关键的。……尤其是西方的教会，还在选择政治，而这种选择往往不是中国理想的政治，而是往往站在西方社会跟中国抗衡和对立的立场上，这样中国社会就会对基督教有所失望。” 一定程度上说，这份报告代表了文化本位主义者的新“非基思潮”，其判断客观公正与否姑且不谈，但这种强烈的“文化的忧郁”揭示出在基督宗教强势文化和主流意识形态左右下民间宗教或民间信仰的生存困境和失落情绪。而这种带着悲愤历史记忆的文化心情，也说明中国本土文化传统与基督宗教的理性会通依然任重道远。当然，另外一种非本土的、排他性的强势声音也不容忽视，即中国虔诚的基督徒继续以“破迷”的高姿态，一方面对外强烈表达被“政治压制”或“宗教迫害”的委屈；另一方面对内积极迎合官方习惯用语来高调地批判民间信仰或民间教派的护教立场，或者将基督教信仰同民主、自由、人权画上等号，以自我满足一种强势文化或普世信仰的优越感。如颇有代表性的张义南在《民间宗教对官权的危害性》一文中声称，民间宗教（包括民间信仰）对抗官权，迷惑皇帝，晚清、民国民间宗教落伍，销蚀了政权基础，教案恰恰是因为基督教福音遇到民间宗教的抵制，当代民间宗教并不具备抵制基督教的能力云云。尽管作者出于自身的虔诚信仰而遭遇过意识形态化的批判，其本意并非要迎合传统意识形态的话语权，效果却是如此惊人地形成“话语共谋”。如同早期来华的基督宗教所执著于排他性的“破迷”运动，或部分乡村家庭教会呈现强烈的“原教旨主义”倾向，上述相关论旨的特征同样体现了一种与“线性历史观”共在的“现代性话语”所累积的文化情绪，并惯性地养就了一种居高临下式的文化强势，用批判的武器来继续“围剿”本土信仰的合理性和合法性。这种吊诡的“话语共谋”格局，某种意义上说是作为文化殖民化之后果的“话语霸权”的显性在场，体现了一种以“话语正义”自居的流行的时代情绪和信仰心情，具体包括两个层面内涵：一是自觉或不自觉地配合西方“坚持宗教自由”、“反对宗教迫害”的话语共谋，“宗教自由”由此变味为当且仅当是一神教的自由和一神教的专制；二是有意或无意地迎合强势的公权力“反对封建迷信”、“反对反动会道门”宣传的话语共谋。于是论者也不断地强化所谓的“高端信仰”与“低端信仰”的区别，前者是宗教，故“宗教自由”自然是第一义的；后者是巫术或迷信，故文化批判便带有所谓“反愚昧”和“再启蒙”的义务。“话语共谋”的文化结果是不时地营造出充满时代感的“信仰悲情”和“信仰使命”，并衍生出“宗教异端化”和“宗教政治化”的奇怪两翼。当信仰不再是个人的私事，而被涂上中西对抗的符号，是否“在中国的基督教”健康发展的福音呢？毋庸置疑，前述非此即彼的话语囚境展示了中国现代化过程中被“现代性”所格式化的思维定势。借用法国学者高万桑的说辞，我们或可吊诡地想像为亚洲思维的“基督宗教化” 。现代性的批判武器一直是指向传统性的批判，并仿佛天然地具有批判的合法性和合理性。当我们已经习惯于被想像为代表“现代性”、“进步性”的宗教批判话语时，仿佛忘却了中世纪“神学婢女”的存在，却聆听了一种代表民主、自由、人权的喃喃呓语。然而，就像基督宗教同民主、自由、人权等普世价值并没有必然的联系一样，中国文化及其附属的信仰形态并不必然同落后、封建、迷信等画上等号，后者同样具有自我传承、创新和获得信仰尊重的基本权利。如果一定要强行进行比附的话，我们同样可以在各类民间信仰的组织（如神明会）及仪式实践（如绕境进香）中看到地方精英和仪式专家在神明面前的“民主”操作和见证，而这恰恰是令劳格文等西方汉学家所惊异的地方事实。在“文化中国”的意义视阈中，我们更需要的是“中国的基督教”谦恭的文化表情，而非以强势文化自居、咄咄逼人的“在中国的基督教”。围绕着如何处理基督宗教与中国民间信仰之间“相遇”问题，我们更应该强调一种立足于“和而不同”的本土思维模式，即所谓“本土情怀与全球视野”，既要庙会，亦要教会；既要坚持文化的主体性，亦当尊重文化的多样性。毕竟，一个自我拒绝“本土情怀”的中华民族，无异于“文化自宫”，丧失其可持续发展之大势。坚持文化主体性的问题，仍然是“保族”、“保种”的问题，仍然是“文化中国”走向世界的保证，仍然是确保文化多样性，反对强势文化专制的根基。当然，我们要用发展的眼光，将走向“本色化”的中国基督宗教纳入多元开放的中华文化视野之中。诚如斯宾格勒所言：并没有从印度传入中国的“佛教”运动，而只有印度佛教徒的丰富的表象中一部分为具有某种宗教倾向的中国人所接受。它形成了一种对于中国佛教徒且仅对于中国佛教徒有意义的新的宗教表现形式。……内涵是不能转换的。两种不同文化的人，各自存在于自己精神的孤寂之中，被一条不可逾越的深渊隔开了。虽然印度人和中国人在那些日子里双方都自觉是佛教徒，他们在精神上依旧离得很远。相同的经文，相同的教义，相同的信条——但是两种不同的心灵，各走自己的路。斯氏或许过于强化了文化互渗过程中的本土适应问题。但是在提倡“和而不同”、“非我无所取”的文明融合大格局中，我们应该具有这样高度的文化自信：在全球化的时代，任何极端的反基督宗教的文化冲动，绝非是一个改革开放的泱泱大国应有的文化气度，而走向“本色化”的中国基督宗教并不必然等同于西方文化或西方宗教，既然它扎根于中国已经成为或必将成为合理的现实，必将是“文化中国”之意义世界中的基督宗教，当且仅当作为开放多元的中华文化体系中的一元。而以“本色化”、“在地化”的基督宗教作为一个有效的参照系，也能促成中国文化在全球化时代的自我反思与不断创新的格局。而中国文化体系无论是精英的还是民间的传统，同样可以在与时俱进的“文化自觉”过程中，在与不同样式的基督宗教的“相遇”过程中，学会“相识”和“相知”，以推动传统的创新。当然，更为根本的问题在于，“在中国的基督教”所具有的强烈“排他性”和“一神教”的典型特征，决定了它对其他宗教形态的强势批判和不妥协立场，它的文化态度是否有“和而不同”的现实可能性，从而走向“宗教包容主义”而非“宗教排他主义”呢？就像佛教的中国化一样，从“在中国的基督教”到“中国的基督教”，还有相当长的历程。三关键热词：“中国民间信仰”的合法化话语近年来围绕着中国宗教格局问题，特别是针对民间信仰的现实问题，各种学术话语的碰撞一直是相当剧烈的。在此我们略作回顾与反思。 1、宗教（文化）生态论新世纪以来，在面对中国宗教的新问题、新挑战、新思路时，宗教（文化）生态论仍然占据着内地学界很大的争议板块。不过，中国宗教生态论的提出和宣扬，与其说是一个纯粹的学理探讨问题，毋宁说是一个深切的人文关怀问题。围绕宗教生态平衡论的争论，更多的是事实的陈述，而非义理的辨析，更缺乏对不同宗教气质差异及社会变量的比较考察，因此其文化反思仍然是相对粗糙而仓促的。其忽然流行的深层性根源，不外有两大背景：一是继续反思“线性化思维”所带来的对本土宗教文化的意识形态的偏见，进而对转型时期国家宗教政策调整的期许和批评；二是因应基督新教的发展所带来的信仰之痒及针对本土价值观的“文化自觉”。诚如法国学者高万桑所言：“近代中国的宗教政策，与其说是反宗教，不如说是在宗教范围中彻底更新、重新划定可接受的、正统的宗教与其他受排斥的迷信的界线，使之能兼容于国家现代化的规划方向里。” 盖源于对“刚性化”的宗教边界划分的困惑，宗教在中国民间的形态是否可以被视为宗教的问题，又重新提上议程。诸如杨庆堃笔下的“分散性宗教”（如民间信仰）以及作为制度性宗教一部分的“民间教派”（“反动会道门”），是否能被纳入国家政策法眼之内，同样构成了一种本能的文化焦虑。冷静地看，离开了中国政教关系的独特语境，原本自成自明的宗教生态论便丧失其特定的文化意义。该论调更多地映现出一种集体的文化心情和时代情绪，是对近代中国“反封建迷信”或“反宗教运动”之启蒙话语的再反思。更确切地说，宗教生态论只是一个因应转型时期的中国宗教事态的人文话题，只是中华文化复兴思潮中的一个思想浪花而已。倘若我们视之为一种创意的学术命题，不免是学术自恋了。一个富有代表性的文化事件，便是2003年中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所课题组所作的《关于福建省民间信仰问题的调研报告》，首次强调从“大宗教观”的视野来观察民间信仰问题，将之定位为“非制度化的宗教形态”，以纳入宗教文化生态系统建设，推动宗教事务管理的科学化、规范化：我们对待民间信仰，既不必刻意指责它的“世俗性”和“功利性”，更无须讳言它的“宗教性”，而应努力保持和运用其宗教性中蕴涵的“神圣性”及“文化正统意识”，从中国文化发展战略的高度考虑将其正式纳入各级政府对宗教事务的管理范围，并依法制定“市场准入”的标准和“游戏规则”，以便更好地调动民间信仰的文化整合功能，使之更有效地参与“宗教文化生态系统”的建设。建设的目的，不但在于要为中国先进文化的繁荣提供某些传统资源，为小康社会提供一种“文化合力”，还在于能够进一步保障宪法规定的公民“宗教信仰自由”权利，减少宗教、人权方面在国内维护社会稳定、在境外维护国家形象的政治成本，又能够保持各种宗教形态的势力均衡和良性竞争。当然，这个调查报告在改变政府对民间信仰的态度方面，发挥了一定的作用。国家在浙江、福建、湖南都针对民间信仰的管理工作做了卓有成效的试点工作。不过，“非制度化的宗教形态”的提法是否合适，还有待重新反思。而作为报告的作者之一，金泽、陈进国等对民间信仰的地位、作用有过进一步的论述和补充。金泽指出，应该走出意识形态和政治的定位，将宗教定位为一种文化资源或文化体系。在中国社会的发展中，我们不仅要关注像“五大宗教”等制度化宗教间的生态平衡，还要关注诸如民间信仰等非制度化宗教与制度化宗教间的生态平衡。而段琦和陈进国在比较江西余干县两个乡镇的基督新教现状时指出，当地宗教生态表现出“空间性失衡”和“时间性失衡”并存的特征。所谓空间性失衡，指各种宗教信仰形态在地理分布上的失衡现象。一则，基督新教与传统宗教信仰形态之间，在区域空间分布上是不平衡的。二则，在基督新教的强势传统播刺激下各乡镇的宗教信仰形态比例的失衡，体现了当地信仰发展中的“常态化”与“非常态化”两种倾向的此消彼长。所谓时间性失衡，指各种宗教信仰形态在阶段性发展中的失衡现象。这种失衡的根源，一则是执政党和主流意识形态从维护社会稳定立场出发宣示“反封建迷信”和“反宗教房股势力”，形成第一重挤压；二则是基督新教从自身教义出发反对“迷信”，反对偶像崇拜，强化自身的宗教话语正义，形成第二重挤压。 2006年，牟钟鉴又提倡“宗教文化生态的中国模式”，“要恢复和发展中国模式的宗教生态，必须在新的历史条件下全面复兴中华民族的优秀文化，包括各种健康的宗教文化，使之各得其所”，呼吁建立宗教文化生态学，被冠为该年度中国宗教学十大观点之一。2010年《中国民族报》更敏锐地推出“宗教生态平衡”栏目，刊发了云南宗教事务局副局长王爱国《民族民间宗教信仰对于宗教生态平衡机制的维系》，强调要“恢复和重建我国的宗教生态平衡”。而同栏目中段琦的《宗教生态失衡对基督教发展的影响——以江西余干县的宗教调查为例》，则强调了西方的“宗教”定义对于分散性宗教的排斥，用实例印证了传统宗教力量保持得较好的地区也就是宗教生态较为平衡的地区，基督新教的发展一般比较缓慢。反之，基督新教则会迅速发展。当然，作为社会事实被陈述的宗教生态论也引发了学界的相关批评。比如，在宗教法治方面研究颇深的刘澎教授所主持的“普世社会科学研究网”，刊发笔名“逆风”的《宗教生态平衡的迷失》，系针对陈进国用“中华教”范畴来指称中国民间信仰形态的批评，并认真反思了生态平衡论背后的逻辑问题。其开篇亦基本认同宗教生态论者的主张：“依据一种份额均等的参照体系，中国的宗教市场出现了失衡这几乎是一个不争的事实。开放宗教市场，给民间信仰存在和发展的合法认可也迫在眉睫。如何开放宗教市场，承认民间信仰作为一种宗教实体存在的合法性，并把它们纳入到既有的国家宗教管理体系中？这成为了摆在宗教管理部门和学界面前的一个重大课题。”但他并不认同过去打击民间信仰间接促进了基督新教的发展，最终导致了宗教市场的失衡，而是强调失衡既有政策的原因，也有文化的根源。宗教市场的不均衡本身也是宗教活力的反映。政府管制某种程度上推动了基督新教的增长，抑制了民间信仰的发展，而这种政策负效应难以通过另外一种主观建构或扶持补偿得以修正。为此，政府应该放弃这种线性的思维，通过宗教立法，使得宗教自由和政教分离成为核心理念，最终让市场这只“看不见的手”来推动宗教均衡的出现。比较而言，牟钟鉴、金泽、陈进国等更强调从文化战略的大视角来为民间信仰“正名”和“脱敏”，从而凸显了近代中国的民族主义话语与基督新教的排他性判教所形成的“话语共谋”潜藏的政策困境，为此民间信仰与基督新教更因宗教气质的差异（如建制化和非建制化，话语的弱势与强势）而形成了不同的文化后果。刘澎或逆风则立足于完全市场化的视角，特别是“压制导致宗教增长”（因外力和组织性的因素，基督新教与民间信仰恰是相反的两极）的理论预设，来讨论基督新教本身的增长和宗教市场失衡的根源。前者突出的是生态（平衡是可以宏观调节的，以复归于自然），后者则强调市场（市场准入则有强弱，更有退市）。无论是生态论者还是市场论者，都相当重视以法律思维来处理宗教事务，以尊重公民社会的宗教信仰自由和宗教结社自由，不过生态论者更重视现实主义的路径，强调在坚持“文化尊重”和“文化主体性”前提上合理化的国家宏观政策及法规这一只“看得见的手”的规范效果，以拨乱反正；市场论者则充满理想主义的色彩，强调宗教自由市场这一只“看不见的手”，以千帆竞发。如果说前者是宗教博弈论者，关注的是政教关系及信仰形态之间如何进行“合作博弈”并追求最佳的“纳什均衡”状态，那么后者就是自由选择学派，偏向于信仰竞争中的弱肉强食、适者生存的丛林法则，而未考虑到本土文化传统继承和发展的天然合理性及优先生存权利。前者应该警惕的是这只“看得见的手”是否伸得太长、太久，是否伸得得体、得当，并如何营造“法规教随”和“教规政随”（参见前述）共在的政教和谐格局；后者则当警惕那只“看不见的手”可能引发的无序竞争（宗教乱象、大鱼吃小鱼）和“宗教托拉斯”（比如某些建制性宗教进行“计划性”地“信仰垄断”与“信仰颠覆”实践）现象，并防止宗教博弈中可能导致的“公海捕鱼”效应和“草地放牧”效应，以及部分地区（如云/贵诸省多族群聚居区）因强势的“信仰颠覆”现象所引发的地方“文化中断”或“文化死亡”问题。此外，李向平也对中国宗教生态论有过猛烈的批评。其针对梁家麟、段琦关于中国基督较快发展原因的看法，以及陈进国在《本土情怀与全球视野》（《中国宗教报告（2009）》）一文中的观点，强调现有的宗教生态说系将“基督教是洋教”和“基督教非洋教”的对抗性认识再度激活了。他认为，陈氏有关“国家应该将‘宗教安全’纳入中远期的‘国家文化安全’规划中，特别是将宗教软实力（包括中国传统宗教文明的普世价值及时代特色）的有效展示和提升，纳入到国家文化战略安全体系当中，从而在非传统安全领域中确保国家的战略安全”的看法，是以民族性来满足现代性；以中国传统或者本土佛道教、民间宗教，以抵制来自西方社会的基督宗教。其结果就是以“宗教民族主义”来建构当代中国宗教信仰结构，反而也可能走向另一种宗教生态的失衡。这种现象类似于全球化背景之下“宗教民粹主义”的冒头，在很大层面是一种彼此整合的权力－信仰现象，把民族认同、国家认同变质为宗教信仰的认同。宗教生态失衡说最大的问题是把“宗教体制”问题转换成为了“宗教生态”问题，使宗教生态现象变质为“华夷之辨”的新版本，并表达了另外一种对体制的路径依赖思想。平心而论，李向平敏锐地指出了宗教生态论和现有宗教管理体制的关联问题，但难免又有断章取义之嫌。中国当代的基督新教同样有“三自教会”与“家庭教会”、基督教异端、邪教等“边界化”界定，从而面临着“正统化”与“脱敏化”的囚徒困境，面临着因政教关系的紧张而感受“非我族类”式的文化抵抗。而部分的民间信仰形态（如妈祖）除了被纳入统战的视野外，也仍然被视为“封建迷信”或“不良习俗”，从而丧失相应的“话语正义”和“信仰自信”。当我们强调兼顾“本土情怀与全球视野”时，从来未将“本色化”、“在地化”的基督教视为“文化中国”之意义世界的域外之物，而是倡导以中华文化固有的“和合精神”，以开放和包容的心态来理解“中国的基督教”。更为重要的是，我们决不能一直抱持着“线性化的思维”，反而将本土信仰传统简单地视为“前现代”或无法适应“现代性”的东西。而全球化背景下在中国咄咄逼人的“宗教托拉斯”的扩张，本身就是对中国固有的宗教文化多样性和本土宗教文化之天然生存权利的蚕食，特别是在强势的“话语共谋”背景之下貌似公平和正义的“宗教自由”诉求，本身就是一种带有强烈排他性和不平等性（用“迷信”或“落后”的话语来排斥本土文化传统）的“宗教（信仰）专制”色彩，其文化后果就是继续营造出“同化主义”的文化单一性和弱肉强食的宗教生态失衡格局，事实上是欧美版的“宗教民族（粹）主义”在中国的变相落实，即以普世主义面目出现的“基督教民族（粹）主义”扩张，其口号就“福音化中国”。因此，李冠陈戴的“宗教民粹（族）主义”的大帽子一直隐含着基督宗教才有资格代表“现代性”，才有资格代表所谓的“公共信仰”和“高端信仰”，而认知和尊重本土信仰文化就是落后的“文化复归”的话语霸权，从而又将“宗教殖民主义”和“宗教民粹主义”的对抗性认识激活了。事实上，中国语境下宗教生态论的立论基础恰恰是一种“和而不同”的“文化自觉”理路，绝非什么带有强烈的政治意涵的欧美版本“宗教民粹（族）主义”。如果说我们的文化态度一定要被安上一个文化符号的话，那么只能称作建立在公民社会基础上的“文化自觉主义”，即鼓吹在构建公民身份认同的基础上，对于本土文化传统（包括传统宗教形态）有一个自知、自明的理解和体认。一方面具有本土眼光，将历史和传统视为“我们文化延续下去的根和种子”，自觉到它的优势和弱势在哪，进行现代的诠释和传统的更新发明，从而使得自身文化也能对世界文化多样性有所贡献；另一方面具有世界眼光，要认知、理解、尊重并吸收他者文化，以共建新的文化语境。费孝通说过：文化自觉是指生活在一定社会中的人对其文化有“自知之明”，明白它的来历、形成过程、所具的特色和它发展的趋向，不带任何“文化回归”的意思，不是要“复归”，同时，也不主张“全盘西化”或“全盘他化”。自知之明是为了加强文化转型的自主能力，取得适应新环境、新时代文化选择的自主地位。文化自觉是一个艰巨的过程，首先要认识自己的文化，了解所接触到的多种文化才有条件在这个正在形成中的多元文化的世界里确立自己的位置，经过自主的适应，和其他文化一起，取长补短，共同建立一个有共同认可的基本秩序和一套与各种文化能和平共处、各抒所长，连手发展的共处守则。当然，“文化自觉”并不只是一种理念和意识，更是一种实践行为。“文化自觉”也不只局限于“天不生仲尼，万古如长夜”一般的精英传统，还应该立足于“十里不同风，百里不同俗”的民间传统。恰因为常民于彼民族文化精神之凝聚是日用而不知，常用而常新，常化而常文，后人方知有即民族即文化的独立之精神的万古长青。因此，宗教生态论所倡议的核心，恰恰是对本土宗教文化有自知之明的“信仰自觉”。而这种“信仰自觉”，并非盲目地寻求那种带有“非此即彼”思维的“以教制教”观念，而是强调不同信仰形态之间的“和而不同”的、多元共在的格局，即在“言教”或“言信仰”的过程中都拥有一个最大的公约数——“文化尊重”（己所不欲，勿施于人）来作为共同的支撑基础，方能建构一个和谐健康的宗教生态圈，从而预防因外来强势文化刺激所导致的一个地方的本土“文化死亡”、“文化中断”和“文化生态”败落。倘若我们不能进行意识和实践上的拨乱反正，不能自信地坚持本土的“信仰自觉”，事实上就谈不上“海纳百川，有容乃大”，从而促进中国的基督宗教与中国文化特别是民间信仰传统的彼此包容，与时俱进。 2、非物质文化遗产论毋庸置疑，宗教（文化）生态论主要是立足于中国民间信仰之“宗教性” 的“正本清源”，是从信仰形态来看我们的日常生活世界，遑论它是被视为“非制度化的宗教形态”、“民俗宗教”、“分散性宗教”，还是“中华教”、“中国宗教”等范畴。仅就政教关系而论，无论是出于管理的“方便法门”抑或对“宗教”理解的多元性和复杂性，至今关于民间信仰宗教属性在中国内地远未一致，尽管“民间信仰”作为“Popular Religions”在国际学术界早已经是共识。但在“话语共谋”之语境下的“民间信仰是不是宗教”的话题本身就是一个很反常的伪问题。不过，新近的“非物质文化遗产”范畴，让我们从更宏观的、更整体的、更结构性的文化形态视角，立足于“民俗性”、“中华性”、“公民性”来理解民间信仰形态所承载的特定群体或地域的文化多样性和自主性。按联合国教科文组织2003年颁布的《保护非物质文化遗产公约•总则》第二条有关定义：被各群体、团体、有时为个人视为其文化遗产的各种实践、表演、表现形式、知识和技能及其有关的工具、实物、工艺品和文化场所（空间）。各个群体和团体随着其所处环境、与自然界的相互关系和历史条件的变化使这种代代相传的非物质遗产得到创新，同时使他们自己具有一种认同感和历史感，从而促进了文化多样性和人类的创造力。在本公约中，只考虑符合现有国际人权文件，各群体、团体和个人之间相互尊重的需要和顺应可持续发展的非物质文化遗产。(a)口头传说和表述，包括作为非物质文化遗产媒介的语言；(b)表演艺术；(c)社会风俗、礼仪、节庆；(d)有关自然界和宇宙的知识和实践；(e)传统的手工艺技能。国务院发布的《关于加强我国非物质文化遗产保护工作的意见》，则将非物质文化遗产视为中国具有重要战略价值的文化资源，是“各族人民世代相承、与群众生活密切相关的各种传统文化表现形式和文化空间”，是中华民族智慧与文明的结晶，是联结民族情感的纽带和维系国家统一的基础。其“所蕴含的中华民族特有的精神价值、思维方式、想像力和文化意识，是维护我国文化身份和文化主权的基本依据”云云。按照上述说辞，大多数民间信仰形态作为中国民众现实存在的生活方式和社区民俗文化的表现形态，自然也养就了生活于其中的地方人群的认同感和历史感，理当被合理地、合法地纳为非物质文化遗产中的“社会风俗、礼仪、节庆”、“有关自然界和宇宙的知识与实践”以及“文化空间”的重要组成部分。特别是在现代社会中，我们又如何从民间社会代代相传的传统智慧中获得丰富的精神营养，以延续我们文化的“根和种子”呢？因为今天创造的文化形态同样是人类发展阶段中的历史表现，亦非永恒，也同样需要历史的文化传承。当我们从“民俗性”、“中华性”、“公民性”的立场将中国民间信仰定位为“非物质文化遗产”组成部分时，我们是在将自身的文化积累和文化多样性打开了一个窗口，从容地展示给世界，以促进文明间的理解和文明共存。从整体性的观点来看我们的信仰形态、生活方式和文化体系，更没有理由否定它的现实合理性及获得自我更新和可持续性发展的权利。而这种“文化尊重”绝不能简单地被视为“文化本地主义”，而恰是立足于差异性的“文化共享”，故而以“与时俱进”的态度继承和保护在地文化的“本真态”（不能称“原生态”，“本真态”是某文化遗产“是其所是”的基本内核），尤其显得重要。因此，当部分学者站在批评宗教生态论的立场，指责继承和保护代代相传的民间信仰形态是将民族（或族群）认同变质为宗教认同时，“非物质文化遗产”概念恰恰又完成了如是话语的消解，使得我们有可能脱开意识形态化和政治化的惯性定位，而较纯粹地理解作为生活方式的民间信仰，及其对促进人类文化多样性的价值。而我们讨论基督宗教与民间信仰的关系，同样可以将其部分地转换为基督宗教与“非物质文化遗产”的关系。由此审视中国的宗教生态失衡问题，俨然涉及“维护文化身份和文化主权”、尊重在地文化的“本真态”的问题，并涉及同情理解本土文明符号的天然合理性和天然生存权的问题，而不再仅仅是宗教信仰自由的问题，或以宗教市场化为借口的“自由退市”的问题。诸如，立足于基督教基本教义派立场指责被确定为“非物质文化遗产”的信仰形态为“迷信”或“低端信仰”，是否涉及尊重本土的文化多样性和文化权利平等问题呢？是否涉及承认代代相传的民间信仰有与时俱进和可持续性发展的创造力呢？特别是如何尊重中国少数民族（族群）地区的本土宗教文化权益保护问题，以避免在维护“宗教自由”名义下的本土“文化中断”呢？在上述意义上，“非物质文化遗产”范畴在悄然“消解”民间信仰的“宗教性”难题时，也平添了我们对其非线性化的文化理解，并避免以追求“�	Traduzione - Inglese TRADITIONS REVIVAL AND FAITH AWARENESS Abstract: recently, in Chinese “modernity discourse现代性话语” we define popular religious beliefs or religious sects as “medieval superstition” or “historical sediment”- However these beliefs originated in “opposition” to official religious activities during the process of Chinese modernization .The contemporary revival of popular religion has to be seen as the main component of the Chinese traditional culture revival, stimulating the “consciousness of being religious信仰自觉”. Till now, in academic debates about traditional religion it was not possible to separate religion from Chinese politics and education, that was his main feature. Now there is a new thinking about religion; an effort has been made to free religion from its label “medieval superstition反封建迷信” and a new rethink about the policy of “opposition to religious movement反宗教运动”. The basic argument of this thesis has to be seen in the aim to let people become aware of their own culture, a correct self-assessment, to avoid the decline and the breakup of Chinese culture. The concept of “intangible culture非物质文化遗产” presents the problem of determining/clear up what the feature are and what popular religion actually is, it makes us understand in the right way the “non linear culture非线性的文化”. Chinese traditional religion is the practice and the consciousness of being “popular religious”, helping to build a social identity of a citizen, (at a cultural level) helping to define the Chinese trinity of religion, folk customs, and “chineseness宗教性、民俗性、中华性的三位一体化” . Trying to analyze the changes and the features of Chinese popular religion, we must consider the Chinese religious view of life and analyze the changes of “modernity discourse” symbolism regarding religion! If we were forced to give our culture a symbol, a sign, then we could only call it “doctrine of cultural self awareness”. In the last century, the consciousness of “being religious” is a cry out for representing Chinese society and culture as a new trend of thoughts in the revival of Chinese traditional culture. PROLOGUE: LAST CENTURY´S SHIFTED DISCOURSE Few century ago, the French military and political leader Napoleon pronounced something that turned out to be prophetic: “China suddenly woke up, and that can shake the world!” Nowadays, in the 20th century Chinese , in the mainstream orthodox discourse China´s “Reform and open to the outside world” is viewed as representing the Chinese constantly strive to improve, the tenacious advance in an epic piece of history, realizing the great revival of “the only way实现中华民族伟大复兴的必由之路”. Developing Chinese culture, building the common essence of “being a chinese” , has also arose the vitality of all the cultures, improved the “soft power软实力” of chinese culture. The change of modern debates in China let us rethink that also religion and his ceremonies need to be respected and understood as the essential core of Chinese culture, turning into a multi-faced religious system多元的宗教关系 where “each one is getting along with each other in harmony”. In particular is the modern century discourse (nationalism or “enlighten the young启蒙话语” discourse) that successfully gave a new name for Chinese popular religion, no more “feudal superstition” or “historical sediments” but now has a connotation as taken part of modern historical process. Trying to clarify and understand what popular religion is, we cannot forget to consider Chinese religious view of life and interpret the change of language´s symbolism. Concerning the “rigidity” and the “boundaries” of the Chinese religious system, where are the borders between the huge and confusing variety of popular Chinese religions? 2: CHINESE CULTURE: THE IDEA OF”POPULAR RELIGION” In the times of globalization and different areas´ integration, we cannot just consider the official parameter to analyze popular religion, instead we could start from considering Du Weiming杜维明 expression “cultural China” to observe religion´s shift (regarding the society of “operating” chinese people being seen as main part of it ). On one side, we should consider all fields of vision starting from the “ceremony, perdition, and seek礼失求诸野”, religion´s popular aspect, right through the periphery and foreign lands influence to examine the cultural system and the religious practice, on the other side we should also think of the aspect of “seek cause in oneself”, the “desire to investigate”, learn through practice and examine minutely, all very important symbols of our culture. In other words, popular religion should comprehend “cultural China” ´s important capital, namely considering also the intrinsic prerequisite of a pluralistic/multi-faced society, including both good and bad aspects, scientific and superstitious parts coexisting, but it should comprehend as well our proper way of living, social network society aspects, cultural status, the value system, the emotion as the foundation of our culture: just if we keep in mind all of those aspects, we can properly understand Chinese beliefs mechanism, and Chinese cultural pattern. “a Chinese is exempt from wearing barbarian clothes, Jiangbiao (area south of the Yangtze) is the ultimate area中华免夫左衽，江表此焉缓带” (Songshu ; Xie Lingyun宋书•谢灵运列传 biographies); “China is made of Chinese people. That who will be educated from the king, he will belong to China, to wear in a proper way, to follow the filial piety and fraternal duty customs, this means being a Chinese” (Tang Code唐律疏议名例律). Being Chinese refers to culture, etiquette and rite customs, being under the heaven (tianxia) and the properness in the appearance. For these reasons, “cultural China” under the influence of globalization needs to deal with much more than one thing, we need to reflect on “chineseness” and Chinese religiosity. The idea of Chinese popular religion and Chinese way of life will bring eventually to a look back on our own cultural point of view. For the “cultural China” point of view, regarding Chinese popular religion and its development, there´s something to pay attention to. First, in south China coastal provinces, popular religions originated from the small villages become the most important vehicle to express and intensify the identification with hua group华族”（华裔, and also they help promoting cultural dialogue (地文化), thus they have deeply influenced the gait of popular religion revival, effectively stimulating the consciousness in the modern times of “being religious”, breeding the cultural soil for identification of ethnic groups, far beyond the geographical distinctions. Since the Qing dynasty, avoiding the chaos of wars and the search for better life conditions generated a big wave of migration of people coming from south-east, and those people carried with themselves all kind of popular religions traditions from their villages, in memory of their own native land, and brought as well with them their meaning of life and growth. For example, in the Fujian province, there´s a poetry in the transcripts of “guest”/migrants family clan, called “past flows迁流诗” or “consulting the ancestors认祖诗” (each version has got his own difference) : “excellent steed (men) often change place, but everywhere they go they establish their three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues. Their foreign land becomes their land, I saw that their alien land is their native land. From morning to night they never forget to consult the destiny, at morning and at evening they have to offer incense to their ancestors. My only wish is that heaven will protect them, and the ginseng (三七男儿总炽昌) will be prosperous to them. From the age of “China can´t bear to recall the moon brightness故国不堪回首月明中”的时代” (Tang Dynasty) on, there´s no land migrant who shifted from their ethnic group to another one没有祖国支持的海外孤民经历了由“落叶归根”到“落地生根”的族群意识之艰难转变. We can say “revert to one´s origin” or “have one´s abode wherever he goes”. One of the most important ground of this phenomenon is exactly the strictly funeral rites for parents and the worship of ancestors, never forgetting where are we coming from, always bringing with us our religious believes. It can be seen everywhere by Chinese people from the southeast coastal provinces ancestral temple, sacred-mountains, guild hall, temple of the gods, the so-called “Chinese religion” or the “worship gods’ doctrine”, essentially popular, namely derived from the people, with the decline of Daoism, with the influence of Buddhism and Confucianism; furthermore, maybe the most important of those are the one derived from ancient teaches, that´s after all present in every time, and everywhere (无时不在，无所不在). The Southeast China coastal province (from now on we´ll call it 南洋) popular religion was also influenced by Islam, Hindu and the south Buddhism, the most important diacritic mark of Chinese civilization. Since the 20th century, the historical process in South China (东南亚) is inseparable from western colonialism. The southern emigrant wave and the difficulty of being conscious to belong to a proper ethnic group formed the ethnic group consciousness, we can see the responsible in the western colonialism. Along with the society ruled by non-Chinese (非华族), Chinese reverting to their own origins were even more considered as foreign/outsiders or no-land people, and because of that the process of putting limits/borders in culture and politics went on and on. In Malaysia, such a thing is still there, the state´s economy is still based on the privileges of the so-called original inhabitants, politics being aimed to apartheid of the magong (马共) – “chinese new residential quarters plan/strategy/politics 华人新村运动, that is hindering Chinese culture. In Indonesia, as Suhuatuo苏哈托 ruled the military affairs, all the school run by Chinese were shut, it wasn´t even possible to read ,listen and write Chinese. At that time in Thailand, the education condition of Chinese people was almost equal. On the other hand, freedom of belief was guaranteed, and so Taoist and Buddhist temple and the affiliated Chinese believers organization didn´t encounter such problems, on the contrary they demonstrated the brute force of Chinese people being able to defend their own identity and their self-awareness of their own culture. And till today, the sacred-mountains bearing the tradition of Chinese spirituality, temple of gods and so on still represent the most significant source of Chinese “local religion”. Just like Wang Chenfa 王琛发 , the Chinese inhabitants in Indonesia have a say “the ultimate crucial point of Chinese sacred-texts has no word to express itself, a man in a mess can only study to shield himself with religion, applying it with chinese scripts” ; “translating religious texts in Indonesian means putting limits , from the classics to the reliable texts (善书), through the historical gods and spirits novel, as a matter of fact the cultural emphasis must be borrowed from another language to convey the meaning (实际上是借用强势文化的语言文字去维续弱势文化的传承), even though this kind of cultural media are not “complete” at all, there are many deviations, and it will anyway contain the details of the “ethnic group´s cultural identification”. Following the democratization of southeast Asia countries and the weakening of ethnocentrism of their politics, along with the spread of the Chinese influence over those countries after the “reform and open to the outside world” , Wang Chenfa said, the politics of anti- sinicization针对华人的同化主义政策brought an unexpected result, namely “impose the use of Indonesian in chinese religion sacred texts, it’s no more limited just to chinese people. If these translated books made easier the reading for other ethnic groups , nevertheless it opens the facing of chinese culture toward 100 million circa of Malaysian people and the spreading of the dialogue between these different cultures.” At the same time, the ideology of anti-communism, and the normalization of relations/dialogue between China and southeast Asia countries, the flow of people coming back to their native countries to visit relatives, offer to ancestors sacrifices, the revival of temple of gods and ceremonial practices, and especially the revival of chinese popular believes in Southeast Asia countries is the most crucial point. Chinese people going abroad bringing with them the tradition of filial piety, that’s for sure the most important factor of chinese popular beliefs changing from being “unusual非常态化” to being “common 常态化”, stimulating and shaping a consciousness of belonging to a proper culture and rebuilding a proper religious culture. We should pay attention to the fact that, basing oneself upon consanguinity, territoriality, sharing of the same language and especially believing in spirits (spirituality), that produces the cultural “capital” of validity of a religion, it produces also the self-identification to an ethnic group regardless of territory one is coming from, such as the Fujian’s culture fever of “Hakka ancestors (客家祖地)” or “Hakka mother’s river(客家母亲河)”, the revival of “territory” ancestral temples. As a result of globalization and “regionalization”, the phenomena of “a-territoriality (transnational跨国主义)” of chinese religions is just unfolding, facilitating the decentralization of the religion organization and the tendency to unite/concentrate the temple according to their kind. Similarly in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, China main territory and Taiwan people respectfully make obeisance to Mazu妈祖/Goddess of Sea, Xuantian Shangdi玄天上帝/God of Northern Heaven or Yaochi Jade Lake’ golden Mama 瑶池金母、Guandi Lord of War关帝, praying them in their temples, and this attempt to establish ties regardless of territory, as well as forming religious community ties. Furthermore Buddhists sects of chinese inhabitants of southeast Asia countries- such as Zhenxi and Jixi 振系和济系, were originally also an effect of temple of gods association. Secondly , pursuing the process of integration/unification/standardization of chinese politics, the popular religious performances 文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏”的博弈筹码, has deeply influenced the development of chinese popular religion, as well as building a cultural space for the revival of religion. At the same time the new reborn religions showed again the old “cultural customs”, but considering the traditional chinese system in some areas, it should also mean a better and better knowledge of the cultural aspects of China, but right now to reach a conclusion seems to be too soon. Just like Gezhao Guan said, the image of China in the last century was deeply influenced by the idea of “tianxia”, especially at the end of the pay tribute system, we can see historical concepts like the ”benefits of a good administration reach far and wide 光被四表、广传四裔” , then it started the custom of creating two antagonist “East” and “West” 习惯于以“东方”自居，中国的他者就是“西方. Since the Qing dynasty took over during 17th century, in the close countries like Japan, North Korea, Vietnam and so on, the strong consciousness of belonging to a proper ethnic group was already affirmed, and the image of chinese culture was regarded as “everywhere everything was ”barbarized”, was a time of upheaval, and the essence of chinese culture was entirely wasted”, “the days of old chinese system are gone, they never will come back again”, but the classical “tianxia” system still exists 今则四海之内，皆是胡服，百年陆沉，中华文物荡然无余”、“中华古制日远而日亡，将不得复见. Other China’s neighbor countries, culturally speaking, didn’t have chinese culture aspects, politically speaking, they were still internationally governed, economically speaking , they’ve just started trade relationship. The former cultural identification between China and those countries was completely gone, just like the huge difference in the same oriental culture .Since 17th century neighbor countries and the politic of “leave further and further away 渐行渐远” give the impression that the 20th century history is just repeating herself. Chinese revolution success affirms that chinese people woke up, but the big dream of a “big overall unified politics” didn’t come true yet, and the huge cultural differences make this even more far away from reality. During the Westernization process of building a “Race-Nation”, in the first period of Guomingdang and Gongchangdan trying to enlighten people and save the nation from extinction, we could already see the distinctive “elitism精英主义” factor of chinese culture, with the hope for an effective chinese modernization. In particular trying to strengthen to control of the areas and to build a new image/consciousness of citizen, both parties separated “superstition” from “religion” with the idea and political tactic to keep going on doing it. However, the huge difference between political ideologies/theories and the practice, brought to divergences in the way of handling popular religion activities and different governing structure, for this reason we have different political strategies for different cultural landscapes. During the twenties and thirties of 20th century, with the promulgation from republican government of “measures to maintain or suppress of temples (神祠存废标准)” in 1928, of “measure to abolish divination, horoscope, wizard and witches and geomancy ” in 1929, “ban witch doctor activity” in 1929, “ban on trading superstition goods” in 1930 and so on, chinese popular religions were pointed as “superstitious” and put under surveillance , banned, abolished ,thus it was successfully created an image of religion that included both Confucian school aspects and organized form (temples form?), it was also a movement against superstitious activities inner the “elitism” tradition. This was exactly the old chinese tradition of “legism”, used to face superstition and popular religion. Scholars and researchers just like Ju Hongying found out that, as the GMD took over in Taiwan , the way the government handled with popular religions was much different; there were measures like “ theocracy superstition 神权迷信”, “movement on folk customs 民俗活动” ; “cultural resources and treasure/rarity 文化资源瑰宝; government structures experimented “ban查禁”, “abolish革除”, “way to improve perfection改善（进）” through “guidance辅导”的政策” and so on, Taiwanese society attaching importance to the trend of chinese politics. For example, in 1950 Taiwan’s province chief executive office announced the “measures to prohibit people bad customs 查禁民间不良习俗办法”, banning the ancestors worshipping society, planchette writing spirits beliefs superstitions and so on, functionaries and people’s representatives should set the example banning the “noisy festivals held in honor of local deities迎神赛会” , 神棍敛财, all activities that should have abolished till 1965. In 1959 “Taiwan’s measures to improve people customs” was published, in which sacrificial rites were pointed, but marry, funeral, longevity were saved, aiming to spare money 避免劳民伤财 . In 1960 Taiwan gave order to apply each county the “improving people customs 民俗改进会”, aiming to correct/adjust sacrificial rites activities. Till 1991, Taiwan’s authorities published “significant measure to strengthen the social conduit 加强改善社会风气重要措施”and “implements to this measure加强改善社会风气重要措施台湾省实施要点” pursuing the improvement and a guidance for calendar activities such as sacrificial rites of temples and festival tradition. Along with the economic liberalization in Taiwan, politics democratization and the autonomy of government, Taiwan’s municipal administration opened a project on ”cultural capital文化资产化”, precisely a change in “festival activities”, for example Yilan province main city, Pingdong province 恒春的“抢孤”, Taizhong province main city’s pilgrimage to Mazu temple and similar activities. Because of this popular religion “cultural space文化空间” increased a lot, temples became the center of cultural and territorial identification, and even an important political site. The above mentioned China politics before 1949 and the removing of restrictions in Taiwan, brought to a western influenced “modern discourse” faced against the religions , similarly to the “materialism” and “atheism” proper to PCC, turned systematically in a “opposition to the medieval superstition 反对封建迷信”, in an“ attack on reactionary secret society打击反动会道门”, in a “tidying up the forces of evil清扫牛鬼蛇神”. Of course the latter concept is not really like the other ones, as it let chinese culture elitism tradition revives. Before the “reform and open to the outside world” there were a series of leftists political acts and cultural movements such as “smash the four olds (ideology, culture, customs, habits) “破四旧”” and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution“文化大革命””, along with the difficulty in maintaining the “elitism confucian tradition精英传统”, popular religions were not moderately controlled or prohibited, on the contrary they were strongly and clearly destroyed, even smashed to pulp sometime, with the result that with the revival of popular religions after the “reform and open to the outside world” the “religion consciousness” had even more cultural concepts and institution’s inertia制度惯性的牵制, so that also in Taiwan 地相比较时难免带有一种“时间差”的错置效应，并持续地造成中国内地“宗教是否自由”的各类风评。It surprises the fact that, at the beginning of 21th century, in Fujian province still is going on the “opposition to medieval superstition” policy, the authorities used government power to demolish at least 10’000 popular temples, bringing serious and negative cultural effects. The 15th February 2004, afternoon 14:15, in the city of Haining, Fujian province, Huang Wangzhen in Wufeng village fired a straw shed spontaneously, this place was used by 60 people to burn incense sticks to seek divine guidance, 40 of them died, 3 of them seriously injured, other 10 of them fled from the fire disaster. A reporter of Xin Jingbao went there to investigate the event, it turned out that the place was fired already four times, but it was anyway soon rebuilt, that was the fifth reconstruction of the temple. We can observe that from 1980 the democratization of Taiwan and the market economy growth of China are seen as the most significant symbol of modernization, but both sides of the Taiwan Straits (China’s Mainland and Taiwan) have one essential difference, a fundamental structure in the policy , that is in the nature of the way they face religion, the way they judge religion, the way they adopt measure against religion, both sides still work on “gradually going, gradually far 渐行渐远” conception , thus gradually they nourish the cultural soil of Taiwanese mentality of people. For example, during the Taiwanese martial-law/restrictions period, the authorities unhesitatingly adopted against the so-called “superstition” or “bad customs” a moderate banning and improving strategy, however they carry forward the elitism traditional policy , at the same time carrying forward chinese traditional culture ( for example revitalization movement) to strengthen political ideology, basically not destroying temples, dismantling them, smashing them and so on, they haven’t taken drastic measures to deal with those situations, they didn’t create a political structure to wreck popular traditions, criticizing in this way the chinese “destroying culture” policy . In 1960 , neoconfucian scholars like Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Tang Zunyi, Zhang Zunmai... analyzing the chinese cultural tradition, 同样充满着一种“花果飘零”、“披麻戴孝”的文化情结. Not few religious scholars claimed that 4th May movement destroyed completely chinese culture: “a millenarian tradition is completely gone after that movement”. This extremely personal/sentimental critique and the “Dao superiority” symbolizing cultural properness, represent the new “historical memory” of chinese mainland, culturally it despises as “false China” or “new barbarian” culture, and still labeled as “foreignized 胡化”, “sovietized 苏俄化” and not “sinicized 非中国化”, we think erroneously chinese traditional culture is preserved in the Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s “revival”, even in Korea and Japan, for this reason there were born different bad thoughts and feelings about China in political, cultural and religious point of view. We have no doubt, that in the last years chinese government appealed for trying to construct an harmonious society to “carry forward chinese culture, building the homeland for common spirituality弘扬中华文化，建设中华民族共有精神家园”, along with being directed against Taiwan’s political announce to “carry forward chinese culture and strengthen the spirituality factor弘扬中华文化，加强精神纽带”, 正是对往昔的“线性历史观”及相应实践的拨乱反正, namely the “linear historical thought 线性历史观” and the practice of bringing order out of chaos 拨乱反正, this process is shifting from “outside China 化外” to “inside China 化内”. The Taiwan-Hong Kong-Macao district haven’t done so far “政治他者”, they offered mainland China an important chance, namely look back at the own culture. In particular , the Taiwan-Hong-Kong-Macao district facing the Buddhist foresightness and the practice of worshipping deities and ancestors , since the reform and open to the outside world spurred on south China to resuscitate very fast chinese beliefs habits, helping to develop also the process for which chinese society gives big importance to religious practices and the “cultural awareness文化自觉”. Reflecting on the way a country defines a limit to legitimate religions and beliefs , we can see that every place found out very active strategies, and for this reason it was reproduced a “map” of the new cultural and social capitals of China. On one side, ceremony experts and the elites actively participated in temple activities (for example retired cadres, teachers, village headman managed temples business or shopkeeper donated their own property to let build the temple, Taoist priests, grandmasters, master of ceremonies and so on were responsible for the rites in the temple) and ceremony practices, letting the temple become a community or operating center with a cultural authority regardless of territory, villages beliefs got developed and rejuvenated gradually; on the other side running counter to popular religions temples, local government considered even more the model of “信仰搭台，旅游唱戏”, just like the temple was a touristic area which started developing “market operations” for “festival celebration” and “ visiting tour”, and for this reason it developed a cultural network by means of territorial religion”. Of course, government authority drove by economic interests selected the religions, the believers becoming a “mobile” figure 动员的对象 , from this it derives kind of “dissimulation” feature of religion 信仰异化现象 “( including for example the temple-museums 博物馆加庙宇的双名), creating this unhealthy wind of temple policy党政办庙的歪风不止. In particular we are talking about the governments’ double judgment coming from the pragmatism principle (on one side we have the revival of reactionary secret society and medieval superstition, that must have prohibited or banned; on the other side we see the use of cultural resources in the “pilgrimage activities”), cultural practices passed through many difficulties . With regard to chinese government, under the circumstances of the separated policy between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, considering also the seeking to a big cultural unification, considering as well that a political unification was an even more pressing reality. Popular religion aspect of the offers to deities forms a solidified and big united front统一战线. And also, the faith in Mazu or the culture of Mazu plays an important role. Chinese People’s political consultative conference’s president Gu Qinglin in 2004 on the occasion of the foundation of the” chinese Mazu cultural association” wrote a representative letter of congratulation in which he affirmed that “Mazu culture is in China an important part of chinese traditional culture, it belongs to every chinese all around the world, helping to promote also a communication bridge and a link between the two sides of the Taiwanese straits”.”Mazu temples associations all around the world and the teams promoting Mazu’s culture, those are going to inherit the excellent chinese virtue, overseas Chinese people got integrated to each other because of it, giving a big contribute as well to promote exchanges between China and Taiwan,. “ To Mazu are given different functions and roles, it’s called also “the goddess of the strait peace”, “minister of world’s united front”. “The Mazu´s cultural exchange society” also uses Mazu as an emblem of a sports met representing the dove of peace and a propitious symbol. This kind of cultural exchange guide is also called “united-front performance文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏”. Of course China and Taiwan persist to exchange Mazu´s culture, bringing along a rise of the religious exchange, on one side promoting the pilgrimage and seeking one´s roots in mainland of Taiwanese believers, on the other side pushing forward a step for the renew and the opening of mainland popular religions temples, causing also increasingly desensitization脱敏化. In particular is the cooperation of Taiwanese temples (for example the Taichung county´s 大甲镇镇澜宫 ), letting chinese temples economically develop, becoming an important example to study and imitate. In regard to our understanding of popular religions, the cultural tradition has got an equivalent function. But, when we observe the cultural exchange model of “文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏”, we must pay attention to the “just one Mazu, each formulates in his own way” problem. On one side we have different interpretation for different Taiwan mainland areas , on the other side China and Taiwan stand for unity. When the model of “文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏”guiding model will be replaced by “文化（信仰）搭台，统战唱戏” auto-guiding model , we should pay attention anyway to the fact that united front custom could resist the cultural exchange. In recent years as the deities of ancestral temples in mainland China has no more the function as guards (离境巡台的活动), which was considered the most important achievement of the “united-front”, 从而生硬地改变了“祖庙—子庙”拟亲化的礼数和法统，诸如“分灵”子庙须至祖庙“进香”，祖庙神明分身最多只在本境界“绕境”的旧统. For example, in 1997 the Meizhou´s “Min(Fujian) trade promotion association” Mazu patrol for 102 days; in 2006 Guandi (God of war) temple in Shanxi duplicated respecting gods patrol stations in three and a half year; in July 2009 it was esteemed a “fixed station” in Taiwan; in July 2009 the King Guanze (广泽尊王) in Nan ‘an visited (巡香)Taiwan for a month; in April 2010 the great emperor of “green rock loving help” palace(青礁慈济祖宫保生大帝) visited Taiwan main island. This kind of model of “visit to pilgrimage” remote from the masses , rather than saying that it´s a perform of an area´s culture, it is better to say that it´s a symbol of politics, some of them are even transforming into a “cultural farce”. When it´s continuously weakening the orthodoxy and the transcendent aspects of temples , then we could immediately see the contradiction between authority power and the localism proper to those temples”, of course it consolidates the cultural antibody of Taiwan mainland and the politics consciousness. Behind what looks like a loose religious cultural exchange, the deficiency and the alienation of Mazu´s belief, along with the lack of religious mass ceremonies, it´s hard to raise the cultural feeling of “each formulates in his own way, one Mazu一个妈祖，各自表述) or “ 2 Mazus” (the religious Mazu and the political Mazu). When in 2007 in Taiwan Jiayi county´s Kaitai Mazu “开台妈祖” performance went abroad for the first time reaching New York to take part in “UN for Taiwan” project, we wonder if there was any emotional excitement behind the preach at “Mazu, minister of the world´s united front”. For this reason, the resuscitated popular religions reproduced the old “cultural dress”, it could be that our understanding of chinese culture or chinese rules is getting better and better, right now it´s too soon to draw a conclusion. In 2003 the research institute of world´s religion “Academy of Social Sciences 社会科学院” in their “Report about the problems of Fujian popular religions” fully discussed on the difficult conditions brought by “religion´s united front”: During the eighties the Mazu´s fever in Fujian´s popular religions activities has to be Considered first of all as a need for handling Taiwan relationship. Ten years later in regard to Mazu cult and similar popular religions activities , we can interpret the action trying to solve Taiwan problem in two ways. One way is considering over 10000 Taiwanese pilgrims visiting the temples to worship the deities in the last ten years, then all the biggest Mazu temples draw support from having a status of “orthodox” temple “正统”地位, This would cause the reaction in Taiwanese people getting a new desire of a sooner unity, so there would be explained the other names given to Mazu, like “the spirit of peace and strait” or “minister of world´s united front”. The other way is considering that during the last ten years, since the Taiwan Independence Movement arose a lot, and a pacific reunification became uncertain, the most important “reunification Factions were not those who believed in Mazu, and the independentist were not necessarily Mazu non Believers; the motivation of the Taiwanese crowd paying respect to the gods is the feelings of identification with chinese culture. If we consider the latter factor just as amplifying the feeling of a religion, and the national consciousness In regard to cultural identification, independency or reunification influence seems to be too limited and relative, but then the former one should also be limited and relative, it means that too optimistically Mazu cult, cultural identification, and reunification were putted at the same level; when the first Interpretation comes from the mouth of Mazu´s temples superintendents, we still need to consider The political status that the temple has got, fighting for sovereignty and economic interests. In 1991 there were two Sino-Japanese mountaineering “parties” in Tibetan area on the holy mountain, the Lama and Tibetan people, they were all unexpectedly chanting, because a conqueror´s act is considered a blasphemy towards the spirited-mountains. And there is a mixed feeling of joyful and tragedy towards the 17 people who died trying to climb the mountain. And the question of Sino-Tibetan culture is still like this, how can they endure the misunderstanding of chinese cultural traditions? For this reason, China and Taiwan´s policy is always trying to highlight the factor of “same origins-same culture同宗同源” and the mutually beneficial aspects, but the “united front” and “religion” have different roles to play, along with the local government searching for interests/benefits, as a consequence they get a strange feeling. Maybe, 或许，渐行渐近与渐行渐远不过一念间耳. In the 17th century the speech in occasion of the liberation of Korea sounded like “today under the chinese rules, the independency belongs to our country now”, so far the dispute between China and Korea over the spiritual culture is still evident, why has to be the memory of our own culture so obstinate ? Third, under the wind of globalization and indigenization, after a long time Catholicism and chinese popular religions having contacts, they still compete each other. Facing the difficult position of desensitization´s prisoners囚徒困境, despite Catholicism has got the advantage of the “orthodoxy superiority话语正义优势”, robbing is not a good strategy彼此“打劫”并非最优的战略均衡. We have actually the public and the private aspect of a religion, why can´t it turn into a peacefully coexisting“信仰共在” cultural pattern? This deserves more investigations. In regard to reciprocal agitations between chinese popular religion and Christianity (the main branches are Catholicism and Protestantism) ( doesn´t it represent a clash between cultures?), we should trace back to end Ming dynasty/ beginning of Qing dynasty “etiquette´s dispute礼仪之争”. “etiquette dispute” genesis came up during the 10 year of Ming dynasty Wangli Emperor (1582), when the Jesuit scholar Li Madou利玛窦 published his missionary work “ Confucianism against Buddhism辟佛补儒” , at that time Christian churches criticized Li Madou, labeling as “superstition” the chinese offering sacrifices to ancestors and to Confucius. Till the middle of 17th century the Catholic books written in chinese became a way to get rid of Buddhism and Taoist traditions. At the beginning of 20th century a scholar from the Jesuit society in Shanghai named Liu Shiqiu compiled a series of books called “chinese superstitions”, in which he criticized traditional believes and customs. It´s full of Christianity principles and mixed chinese popular religions, in particular it speaks about conflicts and misunderstandings of popular religions, with the Boxer rebellion during the end of Qing dynasty it achieved the highest grade. The professor Ju Luyao´s research says that the most significant motivation that led to the Boxer rebellion traces back to Shandong province, in Guan county´s Liyuan eighteen villages town, there each Christian associations was in close relationship to each other. In Liyuan village we could see since the eighth year of Qing dynasty the contradictions of “imperial temple disputes 庙堂之争”, and from then they got worse and worse. In regard to the so-called imperial temple庙堂,“庙”means Jade emperor temple，and “堂”means Catholic church. The Jade emperor temple was built during the reign period of emperor Shengzu in Liyuan town, and it got many free schools inside, it was the place for procession ceremony for gods for the town and the suburbs. The priests of these associations built 30 communities during Tongzhi, a Qing reign period, and from these the school of Jade Emperor temple was founded. On the 29th of the first month of the lunar year, in Liyuan village a detailed list of religious communities was drawn up: 立清分单：冠县邑北境梨园屯圣教会、汉教公因村中旧有义学房宅一所、护济义学田地三十八亩。日久年深，风雨损坏，墙垣坍塌，无力修葺。今同三街会首、地保公同商议，情愿按四股清分。汉教三股，应分田地三十八亩，圣教会应分房宅一处，上带破厅房三间，破西屋三间，大门一座，计宅地三亩零九厘一毫，以备建造天主堂应用。（《教务教案档》第五辑） Then the religious communities were entrusted to the missionaries, the missionaries then demolished by themselves temple residences and church´s façades. The villagers were indignant, they reported that to the gentry´s heads; the missionaries were envied in Chinaas minister, the bishops exerted pressure on officials local government, for this reason it turned out into a dispute between villagers, churches and government, and each of them carried on organizing activities and playing jokes on each other, at the end the situation got uncontrollable, till the broke out of Boxer rebellion in 1898. During the end of Qing dynasty, in the middle of the dispute on popular religions in Liyuan county, traditional religious beliefs and Christian religion differentiated each other with the names of “chinese teaches” and “Confucian churches” “汉教”和“圣教会”, there were different identification to religions, politics and ethnic groups that mutually mingled, it was a very intricate situation, so that religious performances became politic and ethnic performance. Zhuo Xinping says: The so-called “etiquette-dispute trace back to the thoughts that western brought to Asia, not respecting chinese culture and traditions, and this thing brought to conflicts between politics and culture. The result was that China started again to reject western culture, and Open-door policy changed again in a close-door policy. This was for China A painful lesson If we look back at Liyuan county puzzle, that represent the basis for the boxer rebellion, it was not that astonishing, it meant rather that though china´s civilization conflicts exist no more, we still need to analyze the problem of these relationships, and it´s a problem concerning chinese mainland popular religions that we could not evade. The common religious substratum 信仰共在 it´s a historical certainty, and all the precautions took by the government creating the “religions rules法（政）规教随” (by which government manage religious affairs, religious associations and missionary organizations, religious activities and so on) and the “religions canon教规政随” ( by which government manage religions affairs, a draft in which are contained all the rules the religious sects should respect to adapt themselves to tradition) should have led to a mutual respect, how could the harmony between politics and religion be promoted? Just like Zhuo Xinping and Liang Liangcheng said talking about the relationship between Christianity and chinese culture: “ the relationship between Christianity and chinese culture has to be seen in two different ways, one aspect is the improvement of Sino-Western relationship , and that´s a outside factor, the other one is the way by which China relates to Christianity and Christianity to China, this is an internal factor” . Zhuo sentence has centered the point. So far the academic circles surveys say that, when Christianity radically got into traditional lives and attempted to transform the cultural landscape, it changed also “religious life” and “religious experience”, and as a consequence it produced a series of cultural misunderstandings and clashes. In regard to Christian churches and chinese popular religions relationship, scholars and academic´s opinion are always different. In recent years Sunyefang “economical science foundation孙冶方经济科学基金会” report about the new Christian churches making propaganda in chinese small villages, talking about the present conditions of small villages where chinese popular religions and Christianity are contrasting, there´s a lot of critiques towards Christian teaching causing problems in those cultures. If we say that the government still maintain a “nervous policy政治紧张” towards new Christian churches, then we can see that also the people adopt as a reflection this kind of “nervous culture文化紧张”, representing the origin of our traditions got suppressed for a long time, that´s how this feeling of frustration and debility derives from. The author declares referring to chinese village religions, “western religions all keep a kind of “outshining other branches” feature一枝独秀的格局, Taoism and Buddhism although before the reform have rejuvenated , their conditions have withered, just minor details of it rejuvenated actually, the reconstruction of the whole religious system is not possible, it´s in rapid decline”, northern areas are especially like that. New Christian churches brought village families conflictual and tensed situations, they created village society divisions, rewrote modern chinese history, weakened the main parts of traditional culture, intervened in village society and political affairs. For this reason, the government should change ideas in regard to traditional beliefs , should support popular religion; religion policy should be less strict, and so should be also in regard to general believers; and eventually enlarge inspections and controls towards western religions. Zhuo Xinping claims: ”if we observe Christianity in chinese society has very often something to do with politics, for this reason we can say that Christianity choices the policy, the problem is which kind of policy is it choosing, this is a crucial point in China today…it´s especially the western churches that keep on deciding policies, and very often they don´t decide following chinese principles, but very often they adopt a conflicting attitude towards china, china got disappointed by christianity” . Of course, this report express a chauvinist and anti-Christ point of view, his objectivity is impartial, but this kind of strong “melancholic culture” reveals the difficult conditions of popular religions and popular beliefs under the mainstream ideology proper to christianity. This kind of cultural status expresses the fact that chinese cultural tradition and Christian rational understanding (of it)is still far away. Of course the non-chinese point of view should not be ignored as well, namely chinese christians keep on having a “foolish破迷” attitude, one way to interpret it can be their wrong feelings derived from political pressures or religious persecutions; another way can be considering the use of language by government to criticize popular believes or religious sects or comparing christianity with democracy, freedom, human rights and so on, as well as considering our culture as emphasized and excessive. The work of Zhang Yinan “ popular religion and the harmfulness of government power民间宗教对官权的危害性” has a great significance, it talks about popular religions resisting to government authority, confused emperor policy in the late Qing period, the struggles popular religions had to handle, that corroded government power, the christian gospel became a way for chinese popular religions to resist, since popular religions didn´t have any experience in resisting, christianity gave them . Despite the author´s derives from his personal faith and met because of that ideological critics, his original idea didn´t raise the power of traditional ideology discourse, the result instead was that it turned unexpectedly into a “collaborationist discourse话语共谋”. Similarly during the first period the chinese christian associations took books to carry on their “foolish activities 破迷运动”, along with the fundamentalist trend some village churches took, this similarly embodies “modernity discourse现代性话语” that stays along with “linear historical vision线性历史观” and occupied a commanding position, using critics weapons to continue to suppress the legitimacy and the rationality of chinese popular religions. This kind of bizarre “collaborationist discourse 话语共谋” strategy is the result of the “supremacy discourse 话语霸权” during the colonization period, expressing a trend of being considered as “orthodox 话语正义” having two basic connotations: one is to adopt the language consciously or unconsciously the western adopted “insisting on religion freedom 坚持宗教自由”, “resisting at religious persecutions反对宗教迫害the freedom is religion is granted if and only if there´s only one god; the second one is the language of propaganda “opposing the reactionary secret societies” and “opposition to medieval superstitions”. Those differences strengthen continuously the so-called “high or low level of religion 高端信仰”与“低端信仰”, the first one is the religious freedom, that´s of primary importance; the second refers to witchcraft and superstitions, and has a connotation as “opposing the ignorance反愚昧”and “illuminate the people再启蒙”. The result of this “collaborationist language” is building the “religious pessimism信仰悲情” and the “religion mission 信仰使命”, from this it derives the “heterodoxy in religion 宗教异端化”and the “government religion policy宗教政治化”. Religion is no more a personal matter, but it assumes a connotation of the struggle between the West and China; aren´t these “glad tidings” brought by chinese christians? Sure, the language in these contexts shows that China is falling into the pattern of modernity. Using the French author Gao Wangsang saying, we can just in a bizarre wax think about the Asiatic christianity. The modern critics are directed against traditions, as if it naturally posses the criterions of legitimacy and rationality. When we will get used to the image of a religion symbolizing modernity and improvement , as if we are forgetting the chinese middle ages “female slave theology神学婢女”, we will listen respectfully to the incoherent talks of who´s speaking about freedom, democracy and human rights. But, just like christianity doesn´t have certain connections with values like democracy, freedom and human rights, at the same extent chinese traditional religions don´t have a feudalistic, superstitious and looking backward connotations, at the same time we also have inherited, innovated and achieved the basic rights for the religious respect. If we would forced to make a comparison, we could consider all the popular religions activities(like gods temple fairs) , ceremonies and rites (like going on pilgrimage offering incense) as the essence of the territory they´re coming from and the ceremonies specialists as who, before the deities, witnesses of and operate for democracy, this is exactly the point that sinologist found most surprising. In the concept of “cultural China文化中国”, what we need most is chinese Christianity’s attitude not putting supremacy on itself and not getting overbearing/aggressive as well. About the problem of this meeting between christianity and chinese popular religions, what we need to stress is the chinese thought about “harmony but still different和而不同”, the so-called “chinese mood and the world´s field of vision本土情怀与全球视野”, we have temple fairs, but we also have churches, we stress the main body of our culture, but we also have to respect the diversity of our culture. After all, a chinese ethnic group which is refusing the “chinese mood本土情怀”, has the same value as the other无异于“文化自宫, but still is going to lose his sustainable development. The question about stressing just the main body part of a culture is still a problem of “protecting ethnic groups 保族, 保种”,is still a chinese guarantee to the outside world, showing no problems with a multi-faced culture, resisting to the autocracy of a supreme culture. Of course what we need to analyze, is that the assimilation of christianity in China will bring to a openness of chinese culture. Just like Bing Gelei said: There´s no Buddhist activities which were imported by India, we just have A strong influence of Indian Buddhism, it´s a form that fits just the chinese Buddhist disciples. Two different culture persons, each one just being his own essence, There´s an abyss which separates the two. If we think of chinese and Indian people being Buddhist disciples, They´re still very different to each other. If these two persons have read the same classical texts, have adopted the same creed and same precepts—but they two different mind/spirit 不同的心灵, each one will follow his own different way. Xishi has maybe too much intensified the problem of the adaption of christianity in China. But in regard to ”harmonious but still different和而不同” and “非我无所取”, the problem of different cultures getting mixed we´ve got to have a high self-confidence in our culture: in times of globalization, whichever impulse against christianity, is absolutely not a proper manner a open-great-impressive country must have, and the indigenized christianity in China isn’t necessarily the same as a western religion or culture, since it has to take root/adapt in China it will become a rational and local reality, namely christian teachings will absorb chinese culture as well, if and only if chinese cultural system will be open to it. And if the “indigenization” and “territoriality在地化” of christianity will be seriously adopted , it could also facilitate the rethink of China in this globalization time bringing forth new ideas. But chinese cultural system has after all a popular tradition essence, in the process of becoming aware of our own culture, in the meeting with different types of christian teachings we can also learn how to get acquainted with it to bring new ideas to our tradition. Of course there´s more fundamental problems like the strong “exclusiveness/elitism 排他性 “ and “monotheism” proper to christianity, but if christianity decided to criticize and not to trying to reach a compromise with other kind of religion forms, isn´t then its cultural attitude just like “religion contains doctrine宗教包容主义”? The Buddhism in China seems to have same form, from “christianity in China” to a “chinese christianity” there´s still a long way to do. 3: THE LEGITIMATION OF CHINESE POPULAR RELIGIONS Till now the scholars who had investigate chinese religions, especially those who studied the problem of popular religion in China, have always had a violent approach. We´re trying in this chapter to look back and rethink about it 1, religions´ habit In recent years, new problems about chinese religions, new struggles, new thoughts, still occupy a central point in scholars dispute. Anyway the matter of chinese religion form, rather than talk about it as a problem of principle, it would be better to define it as a humanity concern problem. In the dispute on the balance between religions, there are often irrational prejudice, the studies lack of good investigation on the different kind of religions attitude and different society variables, for this reason their thoughts are coarse and hastily made. The origin of it has two backgrounds: one derives from the prejudices proper to the “linear thoughts线性化思维” against chinese popular religions, and the critics and expectations trying to regulate religions government policy; the second is because of the problems the new christian churches brought and the “cultural awareness文化自觉” proper to china´s value system-. Just like the French author Gao Wangsang said: “chinese religions policy, rather than saying it´s against religions, it would be better to say that it´s a renew of religions parameters, a refresh that´s acceptable, it´s like putting a boundary between orthodox religions and those who should be rejected, that should throw the nation in the modernity.” About the rigidity of putting limits between different kind of religions, 宗教在中国民间的形态是否可以被视为宗教的问题，又重新提上议程 . Just like Yang Qingkun wrote: “ the decentralization of religions (in particular popular religions)” and the “institutionalization of some religion sects (the reactionary secret society)” could be brought into nation policy, and could at the same time become a kind of “本能的文化焦虑” . But if we think deeply at it, not considering the unique situation of the relation between government and religion in China, then it´s evident it´s gonna lose its specific cultural meaning. What the thesis should bring to, in relation to the collective chinese culture and the feeling of a particular period, is a new rethink of the resistance to medieval superstition and religious activities. More precisely, the thesis of “religion habit宗教生态论” is just a humanity matter coping with changing time, it´s just an idea in chinese new trend of thoughts that will not bear any fruit, that´s all. If we look at it as a new creative scientific topic, it will be unavoidably a scientific narcissism. A cultural topic that has a great significance is expressed in “report about Fujian popular religion关于福建省民间信仰问题的调研报告” written in 2003 by chinese academy of social sciences on world religions researches, first of all it starts from “religious view of life” to analyze the question of popular religion, and it depicts it as a “non institutionalized religious attitude非制度化的宗教形态”, promoting the “standardization and the scientization科学化、规范化” of religious affairs management: When we have to do with popular religion, we shouldn´t criticize them as ”utilitarian” and “secular” 世俗性”和“功利性, we should instead talk about his religious aspects, we should Keep its religiosity sacredness and cultural orthodoxy神圣性”及“文化正统意识, From the chinese development strategy religion was introduced in each level of Government religious affairs management, following the criterion of “market access市场准入” And the “entertainment rules游戏规则”, so that are founded the integration setting rules For popular religions, and let them have more effective role in building “religious Cultural system宗教文化生态系统”. Building this system doesn´t mean just “select” the cultural And traditional resources and find out the cultural affinity in the society, but also To let he constitution rules grant religious right of freedom, reducing religions, safeguarding The stability of chinese mainland associations(社会?), saving the image of chinese policy from outlands, Keeping the balance and the competition between religions. Of course, this report about the political change concerning popular religion, has a definite function. The politics in Zhejiang, Fujian, Hunan has made an highly effective work experiment on popular religions. However, the non-institutionalized religions still have to fit the religious system and that is pending from the new rethought. One of the author of the report, Jinze Chen Jinguo, has reached a further point in the discussion about popular religions. Jinze said, we should think no more at ideology and political affairs, but simply put religion in the cultural system. During the development of chinese society, we must pay attention not only to the “five big institutionalized religions”, but also to non-institutionalized ones and the popular religions. Comparing Protestantism in two small towns in Yugan county, Jiangxi province, the religion shows not to be in “space-time-balance空间性失衡”和“时间性失衡”. The so-called “space unbalance” means a religion not equally distributed over the territory. Firstly, between Protestantism and popular religions there´s a geographical disequilibrium. Secondly, this disequilibrium shows a trend in religions development of “ordinary” or “extraordinary” 常态化”与“非常态化 features. The so-called “time unbalance” means religions in different developing stages. First if all this derives from the proclaims of the ruling party and the dominant ideology “oppose to medieval superstition” and “反宗教房股势力” , becoming the heaviest pressure; secondly, Protestantism opposed itself to “superstitions”, to worshipping , it made this to strengthen its religious orthodoxy, and this was the second heaviest pressure. In 2006, Mou Zhoujian wrote “model of religious culture in China 宗教文化生态的中国模式”, “we need to resume and develop chinese religious model, we need from a new historical perspective to completely rejuvenate chinese fine culture, including every kind of “sane” religious culture, each of them should have a role to play, calling for the establishment of a religious studies branch, as religion one of the ten most important standpoint of China is. In 2010 “chinese journal 中国民族报” there´s a good article on “religious equilibrium宗教生态平衡” , publishing the statement of vice-director of religious affairs department of Yunnan province “keeping popular religions in the religions equilibrium system 民族民间宗教信仰对于宗教生态平衡机制的维系”, stressing the importance of renewing and refreshing the equilibrium in chinese religious system. There was another article called “religious unbalance under the influence of Protestantism - an example of investigation on religions in Yugan county, Jiangxi province,宗教生态失衡对基督教发展的影响——以江西余干县的宗教调查为例” , stressing the meaning of religion in western culture referring to the decentralization of religions in China, giving examples to verify if traditional religions kept quite good its original territory, if they´re equally distributed in the territory; Protestantism usually develops quite slowly, but in this case, it could develop really rapidly. Of course, all of these statement on religion system, caused many critics from academic circles. For example, the researches by professor Liu Peng, director of “social science researchers net 普世社会科学研究网” about religions legalization, publishing with his pseudonym “against the wind 逆风” “the loose of equilibrium in religion system”, directed against the category of “chinese teaching” Chen Jinguo used to refer to critics of chinese popular religions, seriously rethought the logical problem that´s behind the equilibrium between religions. In his introduction he also advocates a meeting for all the different religious thesis: “according to a commonly accepted system image, chinese religions showed not to be balanced, that´s almost not yet discussed. Opening the religious “market”, giving popular religions legitimacy to coexist and develop, that´s really urgent. We should open this religious market, recognize popular religions and legitimate them, and bring them into the official religious system. That became a great task in religions department and academic circles. “But, on the contrary, the government is attacking popular religions supporting in this way the development of Protestantism, causing this disequilibrium, the motivation of this political tactic comes from cultural origins. The non-balance of the religious system reflects religions different vitality. The government is in this way contributing to some extent to the growing of Protestantism in China, restraining the development of popular religions, and this political strategy reflects also another subjective prejudice. For this reason, the government should abandon this linear thought, it should adopt a religion legislation, and it should let religious freedom and the separation of church and state become a rational concept, and finally by means of “invisible hand 看不见的手”let the balance of religions arise. And also, Mou Zhoujian, Jinze and Chen Jinguo stressed the importance for popular religions of “rectification of names 正名” and “desensitization 脱敏” from a high point of view, giving prominence to “collaborationist language 话语共谋”, derived from modern nationalism di

Master's degree - "L'Orientale", Naples

Anni di esperienza: 14 Registrato in ProZ.com: Dec 2012.

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I have always been fascinated by the world of languages, and have extensive experience in cross cultural communication. I have lived in China, Germany and Italy, and therefore understand the subtle nunances of Chinese, Italian, and German perfectly. This is what I think gives me an edge as a translations.
In addition to this, I am self motivated, disciplined, and take great pride in my meticulous work that is invariably delivered on time.

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